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Introduction
Ballet in the Cultural Cold War

The inspiration for this thesis comes from my father, who danced with the New York City
Ballet, or NYCB, from 1970 to 1996.1 His 26 years as a professional dancer with NYCB allowed
him to travel the globe, collecting many stories along the way that became an essential part of
my childhood. My favorite of these growing up has always been his description of the trip he
took to the Soviet Union with NYCB in 1972, occurring precisely ten years after the debut visit
this paper reflects upon.
In particular, my father’s memory of a day in Kyiv has always piqued my curiosity.
While the State Department instructed the dancers to only interact with locals in official settings,
my dad promptly defied this rule by befriending some boys not much younger than himself (he
was only 19 at the time) in the city. He claims now that it was “difficult to stay away from the
people, they were very friendly, fun, and very happy to meet an American,” though I imagine
people were equally drawn to him for his charm and free-spiritedness just as much as the fact
that he is an American. 2 These boys ended up taking my father on a tour of the city. However,
there seemed to be danger in them interacting. As my dad recalls, “they taught me to go three
streets one way and four the other to meet up with them at different points without looking like
we were together. They told me they could get in trouble for associating with an American.” 3
After spending the day in this fashion, my dad finally returned to the hotel, only to
discover that it had been locked, making it impossible to get inside. Instead of leaving him out on
1

From now on I will refer to New York City Ballet by its abbreviation, NYCB.
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2

2

the streets, his new friends brought him to their home. From what he can remember, doing so
seemed quite problematic, for the boys’ parents gave them quite a scolding before making a
place in the apartment for my father to sleep. Despite whatever danger there may have been in
associating with my American father, this family’s generosity saved my dad from what otherwise
“would have been a difficult night out in the streets.”4 Though he cannot recall their names, he
still insists today that not only did these two boys give him the best tour he had on his entire trip
to the Soviet Union but also saved his life.
My father’s experience is only one of many examples of the American artists going
behind the Iron Curtain as part of a broader scheme in US foreign diplomacy. These endeavors
were part of the Cultural Cold War, a broad term used to describe the intense cultural and
scientific competition between the US and Soviet Russia during the Cold War. Culture, perhaps
one of the most complex terms in the English language, encompasses all human acts that produce
or create an occasion to produce meaning.5 According to Walter Hixon, in the case of the
Cultural Cold War the term culture takes on a specific meaning, referring to the educational,
scientific, or artistic artifacts the two superpowers chose to display.6 Therefore it is perhaps best
to use historian Greg Barnhisel’s definition: the Cultural Cold War was the “struggle for cultural
prestige and influence between the Communist Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc satellites on
one side and the United States and the nations of western Europe on the other.”7
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Ironically, this phenomenon was only possible because American Democracy and Soviet
Communism held similar cultural values, despite their feud over ideological differences.
Stemming from the same humanistic values inherited in the period of Western Enlightenment,
both countries had remarkable consensus on what constituted ‘progress.’ David Caute speaks to
this similarity when he wrote:
Both aspired to universal literacy and the highest possible standards of education
from kindergarten to university. Both claimed to be opposed to racial
discrimination. Both set a premium on public health-care, public hygiene,
swimming pools, games fields, and increased life expectancy. Both boasted
providing the better public libraries–more books for more satisfied readers.
Neither would yield to the other regarding sexual equality and the advancement of
women. Both capitalism and Communism promised superior provision in all such
fields.8
Using Caute’s assertion, we can understand the Cultural Cold War as a competition over
these shared cultural indicators of progress. Often, the display of these indicators occurred
through ‘races’ of similar cultural artifacts, the most notorious being the competition over
technological advancement known as the Space Race. Though less discussed in many historical
analyses, an equally important race occurred in the performing arts sector. Indeed both
superpowers fought the Cultural Cold War through dance diplomacy, the act of sending
individual artists and dance troupes abroad to serve as representatives of their nation and its
ideology.9 The most visible of these interactions was the US-Soviet ballet exchange, a series of
tours beginning in 1959, in which the US sent its American ballet companies to the Soviet Union
in exchange for visits from Soviet ballet companies to the US. Labeled as an attempt to
encourage deténte through artistic collaboration, these companies were sent as political weapons
8
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for propaganda and psychological warfare.10 A critical component in US strategy in the battle for
cultural supremacy, government interest in ballet was at an all-time high in the years of the
exchange, fundamentally changing the relationship between government and dance.
Nevertheless, American dance diplomacy in the Cold War has only recently begun to
grow as a subject of serious historical consideration. The first book to explore this phenomena
was Naima Prevots’ Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War (1998), which
opened the door for more extensive scholarship on the subject. Since then, a growing number of
books exploring dance in Cold War diplomacy have emerged, including David Caute’s The
Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy in the Cold War (2003), Catherine
Gunther Kodat’s Don’t Act, Just Dance: The Metapolitics of Cold War Culture (2015), Clare
Croft’s Dancers as Diplomats: American Choreography in Cultural Exchange (2015), and most
recently Anne Searcy’s Ballet in the Cold War: A Soviet-American Exchange (2020).
This thesis builds on such previous scholarship by evaluating a specific incident of
pertinence in the Cultural Cold War, NYCB’s debut to the Soviet Union in 1962. While many
texts discuss this tour (including the ones listed above), their broader focus often limits the depth
of analysis. Therefore this paper seeks to investigate this event in greater detail, using it as a case
study to consider the ways the State Department and American ballet companies mutually
exploited one another. Furthermore it seeks to question who truly benefited from American
involvement in the ballet exchange.
Broken into four chapters, I begin this analysis by providing historical background on
ballet in the US and Russia prior to the Cold War. This chapter shows the direct influence

10
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Russian ballet had on ballet in America, starting in the 19th century with the development of
classical ballet in Imperial Russia. It also focuses on the relationship between government and
ballet in each country into the 1950s, describing the challenges the artform faced at the start of
the Cold War in each location. By providing this background, this chapter aims to show both the
special relationship Soviet and American ballet had and the apparent advantage Soviet ballet had
over its American counterpart, making it seem entirely implausible that the US would engage in
dance diplomacy using ballet at the start of the Cold War.
In chapter two, I turn my focus to American policy in the Eisenhower Administration.
Looking at the ideological and political changes throughout the 1950’s, this chapter attempts to
explain how ballet found itself intimately involved with foreign diplomacy by the end of the
decade. Additionally, it looks closely at the three Eisenhower Administration policies associated
with the formalization of the US-Soviet ballet exchange, the Emergency Fund for International
Affairs, the State Department’s contract with the American National Theater Academy (ANTA),
and the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, to show both the logical and purely coincidental ways ballet
ended up at the heart of American foreign diplomacy. 11
Chapter three begins a detailed discussion on the specifics of NYCB’s 1962 tour,
investigating the negotiations for NYCB’s Soviet debut in detail. Revolving around the whims of
the company’s general director, Lincoln Kirstein, much of the chapter focuses on his shifting
perception on the benefits of engaging the company in the State Department’s cultural
exportation program. Subsequently, this chapter also uncovers the complicated relationship
between the State Department, ANTA, and other private individuals like the American

11
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impresario Sol Hurok, using the ANTA meeting minutes housed in the University of Arkansas
and New York Public Library. From this analysis, the goals for both NYCB and the State
Department for sending the company behind the Iron Curtain become clear.
In chapter four, I narrate the events of the tour itself. Influenced by Anne Searcy’s notions
of transliteration in the ballet exchange, much of the discussion in this chapter revolves around
the Soviet interpretation of NYCB. Subsequently, I go into some detail about how Khrushchev’s
autocracy shaped public criticism of the company and the general audience’s reception.
Meanwhile, this chapter also discusses the series of political and personal crises that NYCB
experienced on tour and how these events shaped company members’ experiences. Finally, this
chapter looks at the short term aftermath of the tour for NYCB and the State Department,
gauging how each group understood the tour in light of their respective aims.
Finally, I conclude this thesis with a brief discussion on what happened to American
ballet and US policy following the tour. This section looks at US policy following NYCB’s
Soviet debut that affected American ballet, specifically the establishment of the National
Endowment for the Arts. In addition, this discussion goes beyond the Cold War, investigating the
relationship between Cold War dance diplomacy and the success of NYCB. In my final analysis I
make conclusions about the exploitation between the federal government and NYCB, who
ultimately benefited more from the ballet exchange, and the lasting impact of NYCB’s Soviet
debut.

7

Chapter 1
Ballet in the United States and Russia Before the Cold War

Before investigating how the Eisenhower Administration incorporated dance diplomacy
into its Cultural Cold War strategy, it is worth considering the history of ballet prior to the Cold
War in the US and Russia. Ironically, the two countries share a distinct point of origin in their
respective ballet histories. Yet, despite this shared point of origin, ballet in each location would
develop in strikingly different political circumstances resulting in ballet’s disproportionate level
of prestige and governmental support in the Soviet Union compared to the US at the end of
World War Two. Indeed, by the start of the Cold War Soviet ballet had achieved an international
renown, making it all the more interesting that the Eisenhower Administration adopted ballet into
foreign diplomacy.
While the history of ballet globally is long and rich, starting back in the courts of Louis
XIV, this account shall begin with a point in time that radically changed the direction of ballet for
the entire globe; the emigration of French-born dancer Marius Petipa (1818-1910) to St.
Petersburg, Russia in 1847. Although ballet had been present in Russian courts since the decree
of the Imperial Theater system by Catherine the Great in 1756, it was under Petipa that a
distinctly Russian school of technique and repertoire emerged.12 Petipa was only one of many
dancers drawn to St. Petersburg, the “Venice of the north,” because the Tsars of Russia were
offering generous paychecks to dancers to fill their court while interest in the art form in Western

12
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Europe declined.13 Little did anyone know that the arrival of a single man would shape ballet
across the world in the years to come.
At Russia’s Imperial Ballet, Petipa steered the shift from the romantic to the classical era
of ballet.14 Romantic ballet, influenced by the French literary romanticism of the later eighteenth
century, used soft movements to encapsulate “melancholia, spiritual ideals, and suppressed erotic
desire wrought into an escapist fantsay.”15 The most prominent example of romantic ballet, La
Sylphide (1832), encapsulates the romantic style, focusing on movement that emphasizes the
mood and emotion of the story. Most famously performed by Anna Pavlova, the movements,
combined with the costumery of a long skirt, bring the ethereality of her character to life.
Petipa’s choreography took the emotivism of French romantic ballet and merged it with
the experimental technical virtuosity of the Italian tradition of ballet. Choreographically, his
ballets featured larger ensembles with more elaborate stories, and featured more non-narrative
elements, such as the grand pas de deux, which acts as a display of the technicality of the
dancers. Meanwhile, the skirts of female costumes were shortened, creating the tutu to show off
their new technical skills on pointe, and the ballets became substantially longer to accommodate
more changes of scenery, costumery, and technically advanced choreography.16 These changes in
production and choreographic structure defined the era of classical ballets epitomized by Petipa

13
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and Lev Ivanov’s joint choreographic work, perhaps the best-known ballet of all time, Swan Lake
(1895).
In the Romanovs’ court, Petipa’s classical ballet thrived. By the 1890s, training became
highly specialized to suit the needs of classical ballet, creating the institutional system of feeder
schools for ballet companies and the pedagogies for classroom instruction that are still widely
used today. During this time children from middle and upper-class families were specially
selected to study at the Imperial Ballet School, while the dancers at the Imperial Theater became
like members of the tsar’s household. Many received gifts from the imperial family regularly,
and some even engaged in affairs with the Grand Dukes. Meanwhile, watching ballet became a
centerpiece of court life, with the term balletomane developed to describe the many fans of the
form in Russia’s upper class.17 For these reasons, ballet became a symbol of Russian elite culture.
At the start of the twentieth century, Russian ballet dancers began to tour Western
Europe, reanimating ballet audiences there. The most famous of these tour groups was Sergei
Diaghilev’s Ballet Russes, which performed across Europe from 1909 to 1929, presenting some
of the greatest dancers and choreographers from the Russian Imperial Ballet. After officially
cutting ties with the Imperial Theater in 1911, Ballet Russes began to produce increasingly
avant-garde pieces. For instance, Ballet Russes’ original choreographer, Mikhail Fokine
(1880-1942), took choreographic inspiration from American dancer Isadora Duncan’s expressive
and anatomically natural movements in his choreography making pieces that removed
themselves from the rigidity of classical ballet vocabulary.18 Later in life, he claimed that ballet
must “abandon the [classical] divertissement as a diversion from the action of the dance...that
17
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dance and pantomime must be combined…[and] the new ballet should function as a union of the
arts,” notions that were entirely novel at the time.19
Meanwhile, another choreographer for the Ballet Russes, and one of the most famous
male dancers in ballet history, Vaslav Nijinsky, was a known iconoclast. Though not as prolific
as Fokine, the works he made were certainly memorable. Most notably, his Le Sacre du
Printemps, premiering in Paris in 1913, was so “primitive and non refined, seeking to negate the
elements of classical ballet” that it has since become one of the most debated pieces of
choreography in ballet history.20 Accordingly, the Ballet Russes became the face of the
avant-garde in ballet in the West, developing classical ballet into neoclassical ballet, which
values minimalist aesthetics and abstraction over elaborate sets, costumes, narratives, and
emotions.
Some of these Russian dancers and choreographers eventually immigrated to the US,
making a new home for themselves stateside. According to Catherine Gunther Kodat, while
“[w]ealthy Americans have always collected and commissioned artworks and acted as sustaining
patrons for individual writers, painters, and composers,” ballet did not immediately gain traction
in the US.21 Though visits from touring groups like the Ballet Russes became a spectacle of
exoticism, finding support from some of America’s upper-class, there was neither private
funding nor public support for ballet as a standing institution. Whereas countries with current or
former monarchical systems readily welcomed ballet as a remnant of court culture in the early

19
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twentieth century, the founding principles of democracy and capitalism threatened ballet’s
existence in America. Indeed in this period popular political theory warned that federal support
of the arts would result in the elitist control of artistic freedom and encourage frivolity, leading to
tyranny.22
Therefore, in order to survive, many emigres adapted their art to identify more with
American culture. Some took advantage of American venues for dance, such as vaudeville,
variety shows, exercise classes, and theater.23 Others found roots in opera stages, such as Adolph
Bolm, who directed ballet numbers for the Chicago Opera. A former student at the Russian
Imperial Ballet School, Bolm organized and performed on two tours in the US for the Ballet
Russes, during the second of which he sustained a severe spinal cord injury. No longer able to
dance, he decided to remain in America and instituted some of America’s earliest standing
organizations.24 Though these ventures by early emigres do not often make it into historical texts
on ballet history in the US, they should be recognized as the starting point of the artform in
America.
Notably, some of these early dancers in America had left because of political turmoil
back in Russia from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. At the start of the new Bolshevik
government, it was unclear if ballet would continue under a government subsidy similar to its
patronage by the Imperial Court. Particularly, the grand aristocratic nature of classical ballet was
in doubt, with the Orthodox Communists suggesting a total rejection of classical ballet
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vocabulary.25 Ideologically, it would seem unwise to continue the institutionalized patronage of
the art so profoundly intertwined with Imperial culture.
However, even in the earliest years of the new Bolshevik regime, cultural diplomacy was
vital to the aim for the global communist revolution. Since Russian ballet now held a stronghold
in the West thanks to avant-garde troops like the Ballet Russes, it quickly became clear to Lenin
and his peers that ballet must continue as an essential asset to diplomatic relations in Europe.26
Subsequently, ballet became one of the many arts exchanged under the All-Union Society for
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, formed in 1925 to present Soviet culture to
sympathizers abroad, financed and censured under the Ministry of Culture.27
Yet even with an apparent political reason to keep supporting ballet following the
revolution, Russian companies still struggled to produce in the turbulent years following the
Bolshevik take-over. In the months immediately following the revolution, dancers left in a mass
exodus; the Imperial Ballet lost an estimated forty percent of its company.28 Meanwhile, amongst
the financial struggles of the new regime, heating and electricity in theaters became sparse,
making rehearsals near impossible, and the New Economic Policy (NEP) cut theater subsidies,
forcing dancers to work without pay for several months.29 Nevertheless, the show would go on
for those who remained; the ballet companies finding a new audience. In 1919 the adoption of
the Bolshevik program for the enlightenment of the people gave free ballet tickets to the masses.

25
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These free performances drew in people who were financially unable to see the ballet under the
Tsars, who often considered nights in the theater during this period as “an escape from the
horrors of revolutionary reality.”30 Thus, while conditions became harsh for ballet dancers in the
years following the revolution, ballet once again became a focal point of Russian identity
through its new audience.
Meanwhile, the NEP’s relaxation of cultural ideologies increased artistic experimentation
in Russian ballet. Inspired by the avant-garde movement epitomized by Fokine and Nijinsky
abroad, Soviet choreographers like Kasyan Goleizovsky abandoned the separation of dance and
pantomime, relying on the steps alone to provide a narrative. Quite scandalous for the time,
Goleizovsky preferred his pieces to be performed in as little clothing as possible so that the
audience could better see the dancers’ bodies in motion. 31 Meanwhile, Fyodor Lopukhov,
appointed artistic director of the former Imperial Ballet in 1922, made symbolic pieces like his
Magnificence of the Universe, frequently interpreted as both a metaphor for the state of the
Soviet Republic in the NEP and as an affirmation of a higher moral power. 32 Experiments such as
this established choreographic symphonism, a choreographic movement related to neoclassical
ballet in which a dance’s content was neither explicitly narrative nor entirely abstract. Rather
these pieces can best be described as reflections on the narrative the choreographer heard in the
music.
One of these 1920s experimenters in the NEP, a young man by the name of George
Balanchine, would permanently change the trajectory of ballet in the US. Born in St. Petersburg
on January 22, 1904, his Georgian parents, Meliton and Maria Balachivadze, christened their son
30
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Georgi Melitonovitch Balachivadze. At the age of nine, his mother took him and his older sister
to St. Petersburg, attempting to enroll the children into the Imperial Naval Academy and the
ballet department of the Imperial Theater School, respectively. Georgi’s audition for the Naval
Academy was first, where he got rejected immediately because enrollment for the academy was
already full. By pure luck, as the boy and his mother were waiting for his sister’s ballet audition
at the Imperial Theater School to finish, an official of the school suggested to his mother to let
him audition with the other male candidates. Maria subsequently made her son audition, and
while his sister was rejected, Georgi was offered a coveted spot at the school. At only nine years
old, the future choreographer left home and began his career in ballet.33
Georgi Balachivadze graduated from the Leningrad State Choreographic Institute (the
former Imperial Theater School) in 1921, with honors, and joined the State Academic Theater for
Opera and Ballet (the former Imperial Ballet) as a member of the corps de ballet.34 In his free
time, the emerging artist gathered a group of about fifteen of his coworkers, including his first
wife Tamara Geva, to perform his choreographic symphonic pieces in a series of programs titled
“Evenings of the Young Ballet.” 35 While the group had administrative help from Balachivadze’s
close friend and future ballet critic Yuri Slonimsky, the dancers did much of the
behind-the-scenes work for these performances, including sewing their costumes.36 These
“Evenings of Young Ballet,” similar to Kasyan Goleizovsky’s shows, were considered quite
33
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scandalous. In 1923 the government forced the group to disband after a performance set to
Aleksandr Blok’s poetry chanted by a chorus, threatening that they would be fired from their jobs
if they continued to participate in the Young Ballet. 37 However, the ending of the Young Ballet
did not spell the end of opportunities for Balachivadze to choreograph. A year later, a troupe of
dancers, including Balanchivadze, would be sent across the Baltic Sea to tour Europe. The young
choreographer decided not to return to Russia, defecting to join the Ballet Russes as the
company’s newest choreographer. Upon his arrival at the company, he gave himself a new name,
George Balanchine.38

37
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As the company’s head choreographer, Balanchine began to make a name for himself
across Western Europe with his works. Some of his earliest pieces still performed today were
conceived from this period, such as Apollo (1928) and Prodigal Son (1929). Notably, Apollo was
the first ballet Balanchine and Russian composer Igor Stravinsky collaborated on, starting a
friendship that would define their careers and the future of choreographic style in the West.39
Although the choreography of Apollo changed significantly from its premiere to Balanchine’s
death, it is still celebrated as one of the first ballets to completely redefine the relationship
between music, dance, and story. In the piece, the objective of the dancers’ movements is to
visually encapsulate the nuances of the musical score at the expense of creating a dance devoid
of narrative or metaphorical content. This profound belief that any semblance of narrative is not
needed in a ballet, spearheaded by Balanchine and Stravinsky’s collaboration, became
emblematic of the neoclassical style of ballet for the next several decades.40
When Diaghilev died in 1929, the Ballet Russes collapsed. Soon after, the
twenty-five-year-old Balanchine became seriously ill with tuberculosis. Though the
choreographer survived this bout of illness, he never regained full strength, suffering symptoms
of the infection for the remainder of his life.41 Following his recovery, he choreographed for
companies across Europe, though none of these pieces would gain the popularity of his work
with the Ballet Russes. Luckily for Balanchine, his work was not lost on arguably the most
important supporter of American ballet in history, Lincoln Kirstein. An American philanthropist
and impresario, Kirstein approached Balanchine in London in 1933 with the offer to come to
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America to help him build “a distinctly American ballet company.” 42 Balanchine accepted on the
condition that they first create a school, following Kirstein back to New York. The two men
would go on to create one of the world’s most prestigious ballet institutions, NYCB, and its
feeder school, the School of American Ballet.
Balanchine’s arrival in America coincided with the first time a presidential administration
invested in American theater and dance. In the 1930s, as part of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New
Deal, the Works Administration Program aided artists by giving job opportunities to the
unemployed and using art to build an American cultural identity intentionally. The Works
Administration Program elevated theater and dance through the Federal Theater Project, which
provided funds for performances. However, this aid only lasted a couple of years. Funding from
Congress ceased after the Dies Committee of 1938 deemed many of these shows subversive and
anticapitalist and began to suspect choreographers and playwrights of communist activities.43
Soon after, with World War Two in full force, any hint of future federal funding for the arts
disappeared entirely, and most US members of Congress equated the Federal Theater Project
with socialism.44 For American ballet groups in their infancy, like Kirstein and Balanchine’s
endeavors, this meant a continued lack of financial support or audience presence to operate
successfully.
As Kirstein and Balanchine struggled to build a home for ballet in the US, Stalin’s
crackdown on the arts and intellectuals in the 1930s brought an abrupt end to the choreographic
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symphonist movement in Russia. Under Stalin’s regime, the center of ballet shifted from
Leningrad (the Kirov Ballet) to Moscow (the Bolshoi Ballet), and choreographic works had to
abide by Stalin’s prescribed ideology on art, aptly dictated by Andrei Zhdanov at the First
All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers as “Socialist realism… [which] demands of the artist the
truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development.”45 The
result was the creation of the dramballet. The dramballet told straightforward, uplifting stories
about the proletariat, using pantomime that indicated dramatic meaning so that the audience
could not misinterpret the piece’s content. Sometimes called tractor ballets, these pieces had the
grandioseness of classical ballet but were devoid of etherealness and fantasy, portraying heroism
of everyday life using Socialist realism.
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Petipa’s classical ballets also returned to the stage during Stalin’s reign, thanks in
significant part to Agrippa Vagonava. Born in 1879, she worked directly with Petipa and was
known for her vigorous opposition to Lopoukhov’s choreographic experiments in the 1920s.
According to Jennifer Homans, Vagonava’s conservative understanding of ballet “dovetailed
with Stalin’s rigid and distinctly low brow taste…she worked hard to apply the ideas of socialist
realism to dance.”46 Famously, she restaged many of Petipa’s works with elements of Socialist
realism to make them suitable for Stalin’s ideology. For instance, she restaged Swan Lake in
1933 as the dream of a corrupt count to account for the elements of magic central to the story and
added fake blood to the costumes of dying characters to make their deaths more realistic.
Meanwhile, her technique, codified in the publication Fundamentals of the Classical Dance,
expanded and joined the concepts of dramballet to the classical repertoire by teaching students
how to make every step and pantomime contain distinct, easy to understand symbols.47
Though dramballet may have undermined the prestige of Russian ballet for some, the
codified technique of Vaganova and continued performances of the classics brought a mass
following of the Soviet Ballet from all over the globe by the start of the Cold War. During the
Cold War, the Soviets became the primary source of ballet’s most internationally recognized
technicians, such as Galina Ulanova, Mikhail Baryshnikov, Rudolf Nureyev, and Maya
Plisetskaya.48 The impressiveness of their dancers became even more amplified by the Soviet’s
advertisement of its ballet. For instance, in 1947 critics lauded the number of choreographers
they had produced since the start of the twentieth century and described their work as

46

Homans, Apollo’s Angels, 354.
Homans, Apollo’s Angels, 355-6.
48
Naima Prevots, Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War (Middletown, CT. 06459, UNITED
STATES: Wesleyan University Press, 1999), 12,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bard/detail.action?docID=835008.
47

20

“performances of profound substance, distinguished by integrity of conception, entirely in poetic,
musical and choreographic execution,” in a book on the qualities of Soviet ballet.49 By the time
of Stalin’s death in 1953, the two prominent Soviet ballet companies, the Kirov and the Bolshoi,
were internationally recognized as the best in the world.
However, within Soviet Russia, the death of Stalin sparked an internal debate over the
future of choreographic innovation. Facing a period of choreographic stagnation in the 1950s,
Soviet ballet companies and the Soviet Ministry of Culture began discussing the return to more
avant-garde choreography while still presenting certain Soviet values.50 This debate became
more pronounced following Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech, distancing the new Soviet
leadership from Stalin’s crackdown on art, and leading to a subsequent cultural thaw in which
choreographers could more openly defy Soviet socialist realism. For the Soviet ballet, this
marked the beginning of an open debate on the extent to which choreographic style could evolve
and still present its prescribed ideology.51 Therefore, by the time of the Soviet-American ballet
exchange, ballet in Russia had already begun to look toward aesthetics like Balanchine’s
neoclassicism, struggling to apply such aesthetics to their own ideological values.
Meanwhile, the end of World War Two marked a new beginning for ballet in America.
Around this time, many prominent choreographic talents like George Balanchine, Jerome
Robbins, and Antony Tudor emerged on Broadway and other highly visible venues. In addition,
an influx of highly educated Europeans in American metropolitan centers like New York City
arrived thanks to the exodus of these intellects from war-torn Europe. Combining these two
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forces generated an increase in the popularity of ballet in American cities, especially New York,
highlighted by Balanchine and Kirstein’s establishment of the New York City Ballet in 1948. 52
Though audiences were small in their first season, Balanchine’s Firebird (1949), starring Maria
Tallchief, launched the company into rapid success, gaining enough support through private
donations to tour abroad by 1950. While funding remained a major issue, these postwar
conditions finally gave American ballet a chance to make its mark on American and international
audiences alike.53
Thus entering the 1950s, a crucial dynamic between Soviet and American ballet emerged,
in which two evolutions of the same artistic background found themselves in monumentally
different positions at the start of the Cold War. Soviet ballet was highly valued, but faced
stagnation and choreographic debate internally, and American ballet had finally gained a
significant fan base domestically but lacked the funds needed to remain in the public eye and
increase prestige abroad. Perhaps lucky timing for American ballet, the Eisenhower
administration marked the start of a new chapter in government involvement in the arts, helping
American ballet quickly grow its prestige
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Chapter 2
Dance Diplomacy in the Eisenhower Administration

Early Cold War policy in America was symptomatic of an institutionalized fear of
communism. American theorists have long argued that communism opposes the principles of
self-determination and liberty in the US constitution as a “theory that advocates the abolition of
private ownership, all property being vested in the community, and the organization of labor for
the common benefit of all members.”54 For the Wilson administration, this logic led to the first
Red Scare, building the assumption that the elimination of undemocratic states was the key to
world peace.55 When World War Two came to a close after the US dropped nuclear bombs on
Japan and increased Soviet spheres of interest rapidly increased in Eastern Europe, the Truman
administration applied this Wilsonian sentiment as a justification for entering the Cold War.
More specifically, President Truman justified the Cold War by asserting that “the stronger the
voice of a people in the formulation of national policies, the less danger of aggression,”
implicitly stating that the very definition of communism as collective rule made Soviet Russia a
hostile state.56
By 1947, American foreign policy fully embraced the Cold War with President Truman’s
call for a global crusade against communism abroad.57 In response to this call was an
unprecedented mobilization and deployment of national power through the Marshall Plan (1948),
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the US-sponsored program to rehabilitate economies in Western and Southern Europe, as well as
greatly expanded economic influence and continued US military occupation. Meanwhile, the
doctrine of containment, the policy to prevent the expansion of communism, led to US
involvement in proxy wars like the Korean War (1950-1953). With the war, America established
the pattern of hardline containment and democratic influence they would exert abroad in the
years to come.58
Simultaneously to such foreign policy, the domestic policy targeting American
communists and communist sympathizers known as McCarthyism (1950-1954) because of its
association with former senator Joseph Mcarthy, led to the Second Red Scare. Conducted by the
House Committee on Un-American Activities, or HUAC, citizens were systematically targeted. 59
Wielded by Republicans, McCarthyism targeted “the legacy of New Deal liberalism, employers
against labor unions, white supremacists against black civil rights, and upholders of sexual
morality and traditional gender roles against homosexuality and feminism.”60 These attacks
directly affected the world of American ballet, which had traditionally been more welcoming to
queerness, the liberal agenda, and even communism itself, putting the dance community in the
early 1950s in a tenuous position.
One of the most well-known examples of McCarthyism targeting a member of the
American dance community was the accusation of Jerome Robbins, a choreographic icon of
musical theater and dance in New York City during the mid-twentieth century. Because of his
former affiliation with the Communist Party USA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
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pressured Robbins in 1950 to name fellow artists currently or previously enrolled in the party
before HUAC.61 Though he resisted at first, Robbins’ did end up naming eight artists after threats
to expose his homosexuality if he continued to resist cooperation.62
However, as the Soviet Union became increasingly successful with its use of cultural
diplomacy abroad, McCarthyism became less popular. In particular, as Walter Hixon notes, the
Soviets were especially successful in using propaganda in Europe and the third world to target
sore spots in American identity, namely issues of race and class, and lack of high-brow culture. 63
Subsequently, when the Senate censured McCarthy in 1954, Americans’ “[a]nticommunist
sentiments previously centered on accusations and prosecutions turned toward competing with
the Soviet Union by improving American military and cultural achievements.” 64 Suddenly
‘defeating’ communism no longer relied on internal accusations and containment but on using
the very same people that had been accused under McCarthyism as ambassadors of American
identity abroad.
An early sign of this shift toward competing with the Soviet Union using cultural
diplomacy came when the Eisenhower Administration began to ramp up propaganda programs a
year before McCarthy’s censure with the creation of the United States Information Agency, or
USIA.65 According to the agency’s first director Theodore C. Striebert its “mission [was] to show
the peoples of other lands by means of communication techniques...that our objectives and
policies are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress
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and peace.”66 At first, these ‘communication techniques’ were an extension of wartime
information sharing programs like radio broadcasting in Western Europe. However, as time went
on, the USIA turned to increasingly more subtle communication via mediums like
advertisements and arts festivals, and expanded its promotion of American high arts abroad
through literature.67
As cultural propaganda became increasingly valued in Cold War foreign policy,
psychological warfare became a significant operation for the US Central Intelligence Agency, or
CIA.68 Run through the Congress of Central Freedom campaign by CIA agent Michael Josselson
from 1950 to 1967, the CIA published articles in prestigious magazines, held art exhibitions and
performances, and organized international conferences to show the ‘American way’ abroad.
These endeavors were highly secretive, with artists and intellectuals hired as part of this mission
often unaware that their trips abroad were funded or organized by the CIA, and the CIA itself
advancing to the public that the program did not exist.69 Its ultimate goal was to create subtle
psychological warfare where “the subject moves in the direction you desire for reasons which he
believes to be his own.”70 Thus a dual structure for cultural exportation emerged between the
USIA’s propaganda and the CIA’s psychological warfare.
American ballet found itself used in both propaganda and psychological warfare
campaigns in the early stages of their development. Notably, NYCB performed in “Masterpieces
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of the Twentieth Century” in April of 1952, unofficially sponsored by the CIA. 71 Later that year,
the company appeared at the Berlin Cultural Festival, part of a series of government-funded
festivals to rebuild cultural affairs with Germany after World War Two, using American art as
propaganda for the value of western society.72 Though opportunities like these were irregular
prior to 1954, they marked the earliest stages of the US government utilizing ballet for its
political agendas.
In 1954, the administration declared the pertinence of cultural diplomacy in their Cold
War strategy when President Eisenhower enacted the President’s Emergency Fund for
International Affairs. The fund allocated $2,592,000 to the Department of Commerce to increase
US presence in international trade affairs, $2,250,000 to the State Department to put on art and
sports presentations abroad, and $157,000 to the USIA to advertise these presentations. 73 The
fund’s goal is perhaps best expressed in Eisenhower’s request for the fund to the House
Committee on Appropriations. He wrote:
I consider it essential that we take immediate and vigorous action to demonstrate
the superiority of the products and cultural values of our system of free
enterprise… in order to demonstrate the dedication of the United States to peace
and human well-being to offset worldwide Communist propaganda charges that
the United States has no culture and that its industrial production is oriented
toward war.74
Though the fund remained underdeveloped and unstable for its duration, it nevertheless
sparked an increase in cultural exportation. For its first two years, the program faced repeated
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threats of spending cuts from the majority Republican Congress following the 1953 elections.75
Counterintuitively, this tenuousness only increased private support from American philanthropic
foundations like the Rockefeller and Ford foundations to expand cultural programming in the
arts and sciences. These foundations, often working in close collaboration with the Congress of
Central Freedom, organized much of America’s early 1950s cultural demonstrations alongside
the State Department and USIA.76 Hence cultural exportation increased despite arguments in
congress over the budget for cultural diplomacy.
Programming conducted by the State Department using the President’s fund used third
parties to organize these cultural demonstrations to keep the appearance of separation between
state and American cultural enterprise. Indeed in 1954 the State Department contracted ANTA as
its third party venue to organize cultural demonstrations in the performing arts. Originally,
ANTA was a self-supporting tax-exempt organization established by congress in 1935 to present
theater dramas during the Great Depression, to act as their administrative agent. However, in
1946 it became affiliated with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization as the headquarters for the US branch of the International Theater Institute,
expanding its operations to other performing arts.77 Notably, ANTA already had a strong
relationship with the State Department prior to the president’s fund. For example, in 1950, 1951,
and 1953 ANTA helped negotiate tours for American Ballet Theater (ABT) to perform in Latin
America and Europe on behalf of the State Department.78 Therefore it was only fitting for the
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State Department to contract the organization given its international standing and already formed
relationship with the agency.
Dance presentations subsidized by the President’s fund were subsequently planned and
executed by the ANTA Dance panel, headquartered in New York City, working alongside the
State Department and USIA representatives. The panel at the time was made up of some of the
most famous names in American dance, including the choreographers Agnes de Mille and Doris
Humphry, dance critics Emily Coleman and Walter Terry, as well as Martha Hill, the director of
the Juilliard School’s dance department, Lucia Chase the director of ABT, and Lincoln Kirstein,
the general director of NYCB.79 Together these individuals gave recommendations on artists to
send to locations the State Department desired an American cultural presence and made contracts
with dance troupes to tour the globe on behalf of the government.
From the start, the ANTA dance panel took itself very seriously, choosing groups that
best suited the location and audience of the destinations that the State Department requested they
send artists. For example, their first assignment under contract with the State Department was to
send a company to Latin America to participate in the Inter-American Economic and Social
Council in Rio de Janeiro. Believing it essential to impress on the conference members a
representation of US culture that also related to a Latin American audience, the panel quickly
settled on a modern dance troupe led by José Limón, a Mexican-American choreographer and
dancer. Having had recent success with his choreography that combined American modern dance
vocabulary with Mexican traditional dance styles, the panel believed his work best represented a
vision of America as welcoming to Latin American immigrants and their culture. 80 In other
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words, the ANTA dance panel thought his work and background well encapsulated the American
ideal of multiculturalism.
Accordingly, although ANTA had two directors of ballet companies on its panel, they did
not typically insist on using ballet for many of these cultural exportation programs. Both the
panel members and State Department officials feared that ballet’s heritage made its claim as
American too ambiguous compared to modern dance forms defined by American individuals.
They also had concerns about sending ballet into the third world, where they thought target
audiences might not understand the art form.81 Though this sentiment was wrong, Latin America
and the like responded incredibly well to Soviet ballet excursions, American ballet for export
became reserved for European venues where the State Department was not concerned with
impressing American culture on audiences but with proving that America could support
high-brow aesthetics.
However, the Soviet’s frequent and efficient use of ballet abroad pushed the US to use the
form in more locations. In 1956 the Soviet Union developed the Gostkoncert, a subsidiary
organization of the Ministry of Culture made explicitly for organizing tours abroad to increase its
cultural presence. The Gostkoncert became a cornerstone of Soviet cultural diplomacy, working
in tandem with All-Union Society for Cultural Relations in sending ballet all over the globe. 82
Subsequently, the same year the Gostkoncert was established, US Congress provided more
funding for overseas cultural events to strengthen its international relations through the
International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act, enacted “to provide for the
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promotion and strengthening of international relations through cultural and athletic exchanges
and participation in international fairs and festivals.”83 In short, the Eisenhower Administration
seemed to gear up its efforts to control the global stage through cultural consumption only in
response to the Soviets’ expanded cultural exportation.
The year 1956 also marked the beginning of haphazard attempts on either side to engage
in a cultural exchange with one another. Both the Soviet Union and the US began sending
cultural presentations to each other, marketed as attempts at deténte.84 According to Anne Searcy,
it was in these first attempts at a cultural exchange that the Eisenhower Administration began to
seriously consider ballet as a candidate for the State Department’s cultural exportation programs
because “[t]he art form was always a cornerstone of Soviet cultural diplomacy, and in the United
States it was associated strongly…with elevated cultural prestige.”85 It was inevitable that if they
were to engage in a cultural exchange, the Soviets would want to send ballet to the US, and the
US, in turn, would need to respond with its own ballet companies.
Two years later this budding cultural exchange program was formalized with the
Lacy-Zarubin agreement (1958), a two-year contract that outlined the reciprocal process of
exchanging art, media, science, and education between the two superpowers. US intelligence
suggested that the Soviets wanted to engage in this type of diplomacy “for the purpose of
obtaining as much technical and technological information as possible from the US while giving
as little as possible in return.”86 Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration saw it as a
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worthwhile endeavor because it allowed American culture to more freely enter the Soviet Union,
hopefully influencing the Soviet people in America’s favor. 87 Ultimately, both sides seemed
happy with the agreement’s reciprocal nature, giving them equal opportunity to infiltrate the
other side with their culture, and in 1959 the agreement was renewed for an additional two years.
Despite having a formalized system for cultural exchange, negotiating these ballet
exchanges was still a messy process, particularly for the Americans. While on the Soviet side the
Ministry of Culture and Gostkoncert had direct control over their ballet companies, in the US the
State Department and ANTA had to wrangle with the companies being privately run, often
creating subsidiary agreements with them. Moreover, as a semi-private, semi-public group,
ANTA itself began to stray from the methodology the State Department desired for bringing
dance abroad, trying to use the program to support American dance companies financially. 88 For
instance, after the panel had repeatedly tried to use the funds to subsidize dance projects not
initiated by the State Department, State Department representative Max Isenbergh had to remind
the panelists that they did not have absolute authority over who gets sent abroad. In this meeting
he stated that their recommendations were “primarily used by the [State] Department to
determine whether or not an artist or artistic group is of the quality to warrant sending abroad.
After that the State Department makes its own decisions.”89 Though the State Department still
had authority over ANTA, the friction between these two groups became increasingly evident.
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Meanwhile, the State Department had even less control over the private impresarios, who
took it upon themselves to negotiate tours outside the parameters of the Lacy-Zarubin agreement.
While several such impresarios involved themselves in the exchange, by far the most important
to ballet was Sol Hurok. Little is known about Hurok’s life before immigrating to the US in
1906, other than that his birth name was Solomon Izrailevich Gurkov and that his family was of
Ukrainian Jewish descent residing in Pagar. Most sources give his date of birth as April 9, 1888,
though Hurok often claimed he was born later, typically dating himself five years younger.90
Hurok moved to the States as one of the 153,748 Jews who sought asylum from the 1905
pogroms by the “Black Hundreds” proto-fascist group, though he frequently cited boredom of
small-town life in Pagar as his reason for leaving. Naturalized as a US citizen in 1914, Hurok
was penniless, taking odd jobs, including arranging performances for labor organizations.91
Serendipitously his management work blossomed into a profitable business, where Hurok
became one of the most desirable impresarios for performing artists in the world.
For most of his career as an impresario, Hurok dedicated his time bringing Russia’s
performing arts scene to the US. As early as the 1920s, Hurok had already begun negotiations
with the Soviet Ministry of Culture, organizing American tours for Russian artists. In 1930, he
struck a deal with the Ministry of Culture, giving him a monopoly right to engage Soviet artists
for appearance in the US. During this time, he also managed W. de Basil’s the Ballets Russes de
Monte Carlo, a company formed after the death of Diaghilev to continue the legacy of the
original Ballet Russes.92 Though the Ballets Russes de Monte Carlo collapsed during World War
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Two, Hurok continued to support the idea of bringing Russian dancers to America and became
one of the first voices to advocate for Soviet-American exchange long before the Lacy-Zarubin
agreement was signed.93 However, this dream did not come to fruition for some time since
making negotiations with the Russians during Stalin’s regime was nearly impossible. Therefore
when Stalin died in 1953, the impresario became one of the first to engage the Ministry of
Culture about the possibility of bringing Russian ballet, specifically the Bolshoi, to the US.
When the Lacy-Zarubin agreement was signed, Hurok did not step aside from negotiating
privately with the Soviet Union. Rather, he often undermined the agreement by conducting
private negotiations with the Ministry of Culture to bring troupes to America before the State
Department had time to make an offer on their terms. Because of these agreements between
Hurok and the Ministry of Culture, the State Department frequently found itself forced into
contracting groups to go abroad to meet the equal exchange agreement that it had not prepared to
send. Indeed that is exactly how the ballet exchange between the US and Soviet Union started,
with Hurok arranging for the Bolshoi Ballet to come to the US in 1959 without first consulting
the State Department if ballet was a negotiable instrument to use in the agreement.94 Scrambling,
ANTA and the State Department ultimately sent ABT to the Soviet Union in 1960 as the
counter-program to the Bolshoi’s 1959 tour organized by Hurok. With these first two tours, the
ballet exchange formally began.
While the Bolshoi had remarkable success in the US, ABT had mixed results. Financially,
the US lost money in this first exchange. According to a memo in 1961 on the success of the
1960 cultural exchange programs, ABT did not earn a profit in the Soviet Union whereas the
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Bolshoi made a profit thanks to high ticket prices at their venues.95 Meanwhile, though Soviet
audiences lauded the company’s renditions of Petipa’s works like Swan Lake, with Khrushchev
attending ABT’s final performance in the USSR, State Department officials felt that the
international composition of ABT’s company made them seem not American enough, marring
the success.96 Nevertheless, that ABT completed the tour without any major issues or extreme
negative responses from Soviet audiences proved that bringing ballet behind the Iron Curtain
was possible, inspiring the US government to continue the program. They were hopeful that the
continued presence of American ballet behind the Iron Curtain would dispel Soviet propaganda
that the US did not value high arts and ideologically subvert the Soviet people.
Hence by 1960, ballet found itself in a radically different relationship with the federal
government than it had at the start of the Cold War. Before the Cold War, the federal government
largely ignored that ballet. But as Cold War politics shifted to the use of propaganda and
psychological warfare, ballet became involved in covert operations to turn foreign nations
toward democratic values. With the President’s Emergency Fund for International Affairs and the
contract between the State Department and ANTA, ballet became increasingly involved in
persuading Western Europe that America had a high-brow taste. The Soviet Union’s dominance
in ballet all over the globe amplified competition between the two superpowers, coalescing with
the signing of the Lacy-Zarubin agreement, which opened the door to a formalized direct
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exchange of ballet between the superpowers. Though Sol Hurok ultimately spurred on the first
ballet exchange under the Lacy-Zarubin agreement, it nevertheless became the catalyst to
continue the ballet exchange into the Kennedy Administration.
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Chapter 3
Lincoln Kirstein vs. the State Department: Negotiating the 1962 Ballet Exchange

When Sol Hurok contracted the Bolshoi Ballet to appear in the US in 1959, the State
Department’s first choice to send in exchange was NYCB. There were several reasons the State
Department saw NYCB as the best choice. First, the company had recently become more popular
with the hiring of star dancers, like the former ABT dancer Maria Tallchief, and by expanding its
audience through television programming of Balanchine’s The Nutcracker (1954). Second, they
saw Balanchine’s choreography as representative of American high art and had great success
previously using the company as a political tool in Europe.97 Furthermore, given the company’s
participation in dance diplomacy throughout the 1950s, the State Department saw NYCB as an
obvious candidate to go behind the Iron Curtain and a willing participant. Surely then, it came as
a shock to the State Department when the general director of NYCB, Lincoln Kirstein, refused to
bring the company to the Soviet Union for the 1960 exchange. Thus, in order to talk about the
1962 exchange, it is necessary first to go back and consider Lincoln Kirstein’s motives for
involving NYCB in dance diplomacy in the 1950s, and what led to his refusal to take the
company to the Soviet Union in 1960.
Lincoln Edward Kirstein was born May 4, 1907, in Rochester, New York, to Louis and
Rose Kirstein. Thanks to his parents’ wealth, Kirstein grew up in extravagant neighborhoods in
Rochester and later Boston. His mother, Rose, was part of the Stein family, one of Rochester’s
wealthiest and most prominent Jewish families at the time. Meanwhile his father, Louis, a son of
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poor German immigrants, became successful through a series of investments and as president of
Filene’s department stores in 1912.98 Many labeled Kirstein as “hypersensitive” in his youth, and
he struggled academically because of his emotional outbursts. Nevertheless, he received an
above-average education, attending some of the country’s most prestigious schools. After
flunking out of the elite Exeter Academy, his parents sent him to the Berkshire School, where he
met future artists like George Platt Lynes, before getting his degree at Harvard. It took Kirstein
three tries to pass the Harvard entrance exams, and once admitted, he averaged around a D+ in
his classes.99 His mental health likely contributed to these poor grades; Kirstein began to suffer
from manic and depressive episodes in college, diagnosed as bipolar disorder late in his life. As
Kirstein’s biographer Martin Duberman effectively discusses throughout his book, Kirstein also
struggled with his sexuality, spending much of his life closeted, which seemed to cause him
much distress.
Kirstein first began experimenting with philanthropic ventures in art and literature during
his time at Harvard. He and classmate Varian Fry founded the literary quarterly dedicated to
bolstering creative writing among Harvard students and alumni titled The Hound and Horn after
the college’s official literary magazine, The Harvard Advocate, refused to let Kirstein join its
editorial board. The quarterly grew to become one of the most thought-provoking literary
magazines of the 1930s.100 He also created the Harvard Society for Contemporary Art during this
time, which from 1929 to 1936, served as an ongoing program of avant-garde art installations. Its
first show titled “Americans,” became the first of many attempts by Kirstein to place
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significance on American art in global artistic trends. 101 His showing caught the attention of the
founders of the Museum of Modern Art, Abby Aldrich Rockefeller, Lillie P. Bliss, and Mary
Quin Sullivan, inspiring their exhibition plans. Indeed the museum’s trustees named Kirstein to
their Junior Advisory Committee at only twenty-one years old for his work in the Society. After
graduating in 1930, Kirstein moved to New York City to begin his new role at the museum while
also continuing The Hound and Horn and the Harvard Society for Contemporary Art from his
new home.
In college, Kirstein also began writing critical reviews on ballet. In the summer of 1929,
after finishing his junior year at Harvard, he took a two-month trip around Europe, intending to
make new contacts with patrons abroad that could advance the Harvard Society. A fan of dance
since he first saw the Ballet Russes perform as a child, he spent much of this trip seeing various
ballet companies perform. It is on this trip Kistein became exposed to Balanchine’s choreography
for the first time. An instant fan, he described Balanchine’s work in an essay he wrote for the
Hound and Horn as follows: “his dances had the spareness, the lack of decoration… leading out
of mere ingenuity into a revivified, purer, cleaner classicism…just as Stravinsky’s music
transcended Delibes and Tchaikovsky…so Balanchine has transcended Petipa.”102 From that
point on, he became an advocate of Balanchine’s neoclassicism, writing several critiques on how
American dance should take lessons from Balanchine’s choreographic style.
After moving to New York, his critiques evolved into a series of socialist manifestos on
the need for a distinctly American ballet company. Like many intellectuals of New York City’s
art and literary circle in the early 1930s, Kirstein identified with increasingly leftist politics,
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though he never labeled himself a Communist and frequently changed his stance on
depression-era economic policies. Nevertheless, he had written enough left-wing articles and
attended enough meetings with the 1932 Communist Party candidate for president, William Z.
Foster, to warrant the FBI opening a file on him.103 Ultimately Kirstein believed that an
American ballet company could further the movement by identifying as a “proletarian” art form,
instead of an esoteric one. Using minimalist aesthetics, like those found in Balanchine’s work,
his vision of an American ballet would not possess the grandiose or effeminate qualities
American audiences tended to see in classical ballet. Instead, he envisioned ballet in America
containing distinctly masculine and ‘western’ qualities, separating itself from its historical and
cultural ties and encapsulating working-class Americans’ values. Kirstein most aptly described
such principles in the conclusion of his 1935 book, Dance: A Short History of Classic Theatrical
Dancing:
The developed classic ballet [in America] is a powerful modern weapon
articulated by its amplification of ancient language…It has a superior realism to
any remounting of historic incident– the visual actuality of physical impact. And
it has the only valid romanticism possible– the presentation of a human being in
an heightened, super-human capability, a poetic standard for every man and
woman’s ideal capacity…As Russia is a collective expression of Asia and the
East, so is America a collective expression of Europe and the West. 104
Though at times paradoxical, his argument ultimately convinced his inner circle to
finance his bringing Balanchine to America in 1933. 105 Soon after Balanchine arrived in New
York, Kirstein developed the American Ballet (1935), a ballet company co-directed by
Balanchine, and the Ballet Caravan (1936), a touring dance company dedicated to
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commissioning ballets with American themes created solely by American artists. Though critical
to the development of the more successful NYCB established in 1948, these companies folded
financially in a matter of a few years, in part because of the Dies Committee’s investigations in
1938. The very language of a “people’s art” that Kirstein used to gain support for bringing
Balanchine to America was now flagged by the committee as communist propaganda, while the
concept of a touring “caravan” was deemed a dangerous instrument for spreading communism.106
His ballet companies represented the ideological opposite of American values for the Dies
Committee, thus deeming his vision of an American ballet subversive in the eyes of the US
government.
Moreover, Kirstein had also underestimated the extent to which American audiences
watched ballet precisely because it was foreign. As Kirstein was trying to sell this American
ballet, Sol Hurok grew American audiences for Russian ballet with W. de Basil’s the Ballets
Russes de Monte Carlo. Across the US, the Ballets Russes de Monte Carlo performed Petipa’s
classics, works by Fokine, and even a couple of Balanchine works, marketing itself as an
authentic representation of Imperial Russian culture. Notably absent from their repertoire were
works made in the Soviet Union during the NEP period, suggesting the company wanted to
refrain from making any direct ties to the Soviets. Instead, advertisements for the company
focused on the ‘baby ballerinas’ Irina Baronova, Tatiana Riabouchinska, and Tamara
Toumanova, described as the epitome of the great Russian ballet training.107 It turned out that
Hurok’s the Ballets Russes de Monte Carlo did better in box offices than Kirstein’s companies,
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with Kirstein failing to expand his own companies’ bookings because he frequently lost theater
spaces to Hurok.108 This feud over theater space began a long-standing rivalry between the two
men, and Kirstein ultimately failed to win over any significant following with his American
socialist ballet vision.
Though Kirstein would create subsequent companies in the early and late 1940s, with a
gap period during the time in which he served in World War Two as a private first class
(1943-1945), none stuck until the creation of the Ballet Society in 1946, renamed NYCB in 1948
when it acquired the City Center Theater as its main performance venue. The sudden success of
NYCB comes from both the appeal of Balanchine’s choreography for New York City’s rapidly
growing intellectual audience following the war and Kirstein’s ability to market the company in
the context of the emerging Cold War discourse. As American politics became increasingly
conservative in the post-war years with McCarthy’s campaign against domestic communism,
Kirstein’s public argument for an American ballet shifted, though he still retained his now
long-standing left-wing views in private discourse. Instead of focusing on how American ballet
could be ‘for the people,’ Kirstein focused on branding Balanchine’s recent choreographic
success in New York City as proof that Western democracy and capitalism create the
environments necessary for cultural innovation.109
This new pro-democratic argument became the central branding message of the company
for the next decade. Following NYCB’s first international appearance in London in 1950,
Kirstein decided to develop a new publicity program for the company around this message,
telling his Board of Directors that the company would now “be built up as a civic company, a
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national cultural manifestation and agency of international goodwill.”110 From this point on,
Kirstein advertised the company as emblematic of the heights art can achieve if given the
absolute freedom a democracy provides. According to Catherine Gunther Kodat, it was no
coincidence that Kirstein made this sudden shift. She states that his argument aligned ballet with
the federal government’s political needs when it came to foreign diplomacy while simultaneously
tapping into the postwar American psyche of exceptionalism, helping NYCB become the
preferred candidate by the State Department for sending abroad in the years to come.111
However, to prove that American ballet had eclipsed its Russian heritage because of its
democratic, capitalist settings, Kirstein needed two things; approval of NYCB from European
audiences, the long time competition ground for presenting a nation’s ballet, and enough money
for the company to perform domestically and abroad year-round. While thus far NYCB had been
met with success wherever it went, the company still struggled with the costs of operation to
keep the City Center running, significantly impacting their ability to do any extensive touring
domestically or abroad. In fact the situation became so dire in May of 1952 that Kirstein wrote to
company manager Betty Cage that he feared he would have to “raid” the budget for NYCB’s
feeder school, the School of American Ballet, to keep the lights on in the city Center. 112 In these
times of financial stress and the need for international rapport, Kirstein sought investment from
outside organizations to keep NYCB going.
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Thus when Nicholas Nabokov, Secretary-General of the International Secretariat of the
Congress for Cultural Freedom and longtime friend of Balanchine, contacted NYCB about the
opportunity to perform in the international festival “Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century” in
1952, the company was quick to sign on to the opportunity.113 Though this trip ultimately did
little to solve the company’s financial problems– the City Center’s financial director had advised
Kirstein that they would likely have to cancel NYCB’s fall season that year while they were at
the festival– it put the company on the State Department’s radar for future endeavors. Not long
after the start of the “Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century,” the State Department asked
Kirstein if the company would be willing to attend the Berlin Cultural Festival later in the year.
Hoping that the festival would bring in an additional $20,000 for the company to use to secure
future seasons at the City Center, Kirstein agreed.114
Though audiences at the Berlin Cultural festival overwhelmingly supported NYCB,
further securing their prestige abroad, the trip sowed first seeds of distrust between Balanchine
and the State Department. In his years since moving to the US, Balanchine had become quite the
Americanophile, regularly sporting cowboy attire, making references to the newest Hollywood
movies, and repeatedly expressing his allegiance to America in public. Nevertheless, he found
the State Department’s handling of the company in 1952 entirely inappropriate. In particular, it
deeply offended Balanchine that organizers for the trip used a cargo plane with makeshift seating
and little heat to transport his dancers.115 He became weary of dealing with the State Department
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from that point on because he believed they did not know how to properly care for the needs of
his ballet company.
On the other hand, the audience reception from these excursions gave Kirstein enough
reason to believe that government sponsorship was a viable solution to the company’s financial
stresses and need for prestige abroad. Subsequently, he joined the ANTA dance panel in 1954,
becoming one of the central organizers for State Department-sponsored dance tours abroad. By
the end of the decade, the company had become one of the most well-traveled in the world,
making multiple appearances in Western Europe and the Far East, all funded by the US
government.

Fig. 3.1 NYCB’s Government Sponsored Tours in the 1950s
Year

Reason Abroad

Destinations Visited

Federal Agency Involved

Masterpieces of the
20th Century & Berlin
1952 Cultural Festivals

Barcelona, Paris, Florence,
Lausanne, Zurich, The Hague,
London, Edinburgh, and Berlin.

CIA / State Department

1953 European Tour

Venice, Como, Naples, Rome,
Florence, Trieste, Bologna, Genoa,
Munich, Stuttgart, and Brussels.

State Department

1955 European Tour

Monte Carlo, Marseilles, Lyons,
Florence, Rome, Bordeaux, Lisbon,
Paris, Lausanne, Zurich, Stuttgart,
and Amsterdam.

State Department

1956 European Tour

Salzburg, Vienna, Zurich, Venice,
Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Brussels,
Antwerp, Paris, Cologne,
Copenhagen, and Stockholm.

State Department

1958 Far East Tour

Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. State Department
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Thus given Kirstein’s motives for NYCB’s high involvement in cultural diplomacy
leading up to the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, it seems odd at first glance that he refused to bring
the company to the Soviet Union. Suppose one considers Anne Searcy’s assertion that Kirstein
became involved in ANTA both for NYCB’s personal gain and because of a sense of patriotic
duty; it becomes even more strange to think that Kirstein suddenly just changed his mind.116
Nevertheless, looking more closely at the ANTA dance panel meeting minutes, one finds
Kirstein’s faith in the benefit of ballet diplomacy for NYCB (and American ballet more broadly)
had all but disappeared by the end of the 1950s, providing a logical explanation for his rejection.
As early as 1955, the first signs of Kirstein’s disgruntlement with the State Department
appeared. During this year, Kirstein seems to become increasingly annoyed at the State
Department for interrupting NYCB’s domestic seasons. For example, in the meeting minutes
from November 17, 1955, Kirstein shared that the South American tour by NYCB star dancers
Maria Tallchief and Andre Eglevisky that the State Department insisted upon had “greatly hurt
the box office.”117 Unfortunately, Kirstein does not supply a reason for why the removal of these
two stars hurt the company’s finances, nor did I find any evidence to support his claim. If we
believe this statement is true, a reasonable guess for this loss at the box office is that a significant
fan base for these two stars did not buy tickets that season because of their absence. Nevertheless
this instance shows the start of Kirstein voicing a negative reaction to the State Department’s
program.
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Meanwhile, it is also important to note that Kirstein could not vote on any ANTA
organized NYCB trips after 1955. After the initial contract between ANTA and the State
Department became known, criticism quickly arose from dance critics, the most notable being
John Martin of the New York Times. He and others argued that the contract gave those who
represented dance companies on the panel an unfair advantage in receiving the President’s
emergency funds.118 In response, the panelists drafted an agreement in 1956 that “members
having close professional ties with a specific organization and/or artist refrain from voting when
a subject affecting their interests is proposed.”119 However, this agreement seems to have been
more of a facade to quell critics of ANTA’s operations than a real commitment. If Kirstein could
not vote on sending NYCB abroad, he was still actively involved in planning these trips.
Nevertheless, only a year later one finds Kirstein questioning the value of the diplomatic
tours at all. In NYCB’s 1956 tour of Europe, the company suffered a personal tragedy when
principal dancer and Balanchine’s fourth wife, Tanaquil Le Clerq, contracted polio, becoming
paralyzed waist down for the remainder of her life. Perhaps reflecting on this tragedy, Kirstein
lamented in an ANTA meeting in November of that year that the State Department-sponsored
tours were too long and strenuous for the dancers. He stated that ANTA and the State
Department should shorten these tours even if “Washington…feels these strenuous tours are
worth every effort from the wonderful results obtained.”120 Later in the same meeting, he claimed
that the tours do not even meet the true ‘wonderful results’ the State Department claimed
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because of major underfunding compared to the Soviets. Kirstein goes on to suggest that with the
current funding by the State Department it was impossible to compete with the Russians because
they have “so many more technicians, stage hands, lighting equipment, etcetera, and that they
make a fantastic showing in comparison to the United States.”121 These statements suggest that
Kirstein had begun to lose faith in the State Department’s ability to adequately finance these
tours or organize them in a manner that satisfactorily protected the dancers.
Despite Kirstein’s growing frustrations, the company still participated in the State
Department’s program, departing for an extended Far East tour of Japan, Australia, and the
Philippines in 1958. Another success toward Kirstein’s goal of creating respect for American
ballet, the trip solidified NYCB’s international renown. The Japanese critics labeled the company
as second only to the Soviet Union’s Bolshoi and Kirov ballets, affirming the position held by
most dance critics at the time.122 Meanwhile, for Kirstein personally, the trip was life-changing,
sparking his fascination with Japanese culture. Subsequently he would spend the rest of his life
organizing cultural exchanges between performing artists in the US and Japan.123
Nevertheless, the tour was another failure financially. Notably, the details of the tour were
left to the Japanese managers who had paid the guarantee for the trip. Kirstein felt that the theater
the managers booked for their first destination in Japan was a “‘criminal disaster’ –meaning it
hadn’t enough space for even elementary scenery and special effects, and its footlights were neon
tubes.”124 In the end, the trip was disastrously underfunded, with the State Department unable (or
perhaps just unwilling) to cover any of the unexpected expenses on the trip that the company
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could not afford thanks to a down year in the box office in 1957, and NYCB returned with debt
and multiple injured dancers.125
Planning for NYCB’s Far East tour coincided with the signing of the Lacy-Zarubin
Agreement. Indeed shortly before the signing, discussions about a possible Soviet-American
exchange arose between the State Department and ANTA. Kirstein insinuated that he would let
the company go behind the Iron Curtain if specifically asked by the State Department. In that
meeting, Kirstein offered the company to tour the Soviet Union “if useful to the State
Department.”126 However, when the State Department officially asked him to bring NYCB to the
Soviet Union later that year, Kirstein revoked his initial offer. Though Kirstein may have already
begun to grow frustrated with the planning for the Far East tour, it seems that the final straw that
finally broke Kirstein’s trust in using the State Department for the company’s benefit was the
Department’s unrelenting favoritism toward music over dance for cultural export.
In an ANTA meeting on September 25th, 1958, Kirstein and his fellow panelists asked
the State Department how much more funding they should expect to receive for future dance
diplomacy programs. As part of the State Department representative’s response, he explained to
Kirstein and the other ANTA panelists that “[m]usic will continue to dominate the money spent
and projects sent. Dance is second in both these areas.”127 This seems to have struck a chord with
Kirstein, who rejected the State Department’s offer for NYCB to go to the Soviet Union later in
the same meeting stating his anger that the government would not better fund dance.128
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Ultimately in January of 1960, under the auspices that his presence as acting director of NYCB
was a conflict of interest, Kirstein resigned from the panel and effectively removed NYCB from
American dance diplomacy.
Kirstein’s frustration about the lack of funding for their dance programs compared to
music was a shared sentiment with the rest of the panel. In general, the panelists believed that the
State Department did not understand, nor care to learn, the complexities of maintaining an
exportation program of American dance. In their eyes, success abroad could only come if dance
gained enough support from the government to become financially independent. For example,
Kirstein pointedly noted in the same 1958 ANTA meeting on behalf of the panelists to the State
Department, “it is hard for any company to exist in the United States,” with the current lack of
federal support for the art.129 Putting music ahead of dance served as proof to ANTA members
that the State Department did not honestly care about the longevity of dance in America but only
the short-term gain of exploiting dance in the Cultural Cold War.
Several panelists also wished for the State Department to take a less active role in
organizing the tours. Since the signing of the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, and more so after
Kennedy took office, the government had increasingly encroached on ANTA’s responsibilities.
To the panelists, this more hands-on approach did not benefit the outcome of the tours since the
State Department representatives were not experts in the arts. To them, the government took too
much control of something they did not understand.130 In other words, they believed that if
American ballet was ever to surpass its Soviet counterpart in the Cultural Cold War, the
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government should spend more money on the program and less time directing the panel they
hired as experts in the field.
To the State Department, these arguments surely seemed ludicrous. They had no
responsibility to dance’s domestic affairs, for that was never the purpose of involving themselves
with dance. In response to Kirstein’s concerns about funding American dance, State Department
representative Max Isenberg reminded them that “this program was not organized to give broad,
liberal support of the arts at home.”131 Meanwhile, ANTA’s many attempts to use the funds more
broadly throughout the 1950s had led to arguably justified supervision of them by the State
Department. Indeed, in the Kennedy administration, problems with subsidiaries like ANTA led to
the restructuring of the cultural diplomacy process. By 1962 Kennedy had begun restructuring
the entire field of international education and cultural relations to consolidate power in the
executive branch, stating the following:
[T]his whole field is urgently in need of imaginative policy development,
unification and vigorous direction. These activities are presently scattered among
many agencies of the Federal Government. Only by centering responsibility for
leadership and direction at an appropriate place in the governmental structure can
we hope to achieve the required results.132
In part, Kennedy’s restructuring may have been a response to the decrease in cultural
exportation in 1960-1961. In the case of dance specifically, this dry spell probably had something
to do with the building disagreements between ANTA and the State Department. Undoubtedly,
the spring of 1960 was troubled, with the now notorious U-2 spy plane incident occurring in
May, worsening tension between Khrushchev and Eisenhower. Nevertheless, the incident did not
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result in any substantial reduction in cultural exchange as planned under the Lacy-Zarubin
agreement, with ABT still getting approved to tour the Soviet Union in September of that year by
the Ministry of Culture.133 Rather, the lack of cultural exportation on the part of the US started
later in November, with the State Department no longer sponsoring any foreign appearances of
dance companies, even though at the same time the Soviets sent seven dance troupes and five
individual artists to Western Europe, Latin America, and across Asia. 134
This is not to say that there was a sudden void of American dance abroad. On the
contrary, smaller dance troupes continued to tour without the assistance of the State Department
across Western Europe.135 Kirstein, too, tried to join this wave of American touring without help
from the federal government, planning a second tour of Japan to take place at the end of 1961.
However, these plans quickly disintegrated when he realized that taking a company of such a
large size as NYCB was not feasible without outside aid.136 Around this point in time, Kirstein
began talks with the chief of the State Department’s cultural presentations division, Heath
Bowman, on potentially sending NYCB to the USSR.137
Soon after these talks began, Kirstein announced in January of 1961 that NYCB would
indeed go to the Soviet Union as part of the ballet exchange. It is not entirely clear exactly when
and why Kirstein changed his mind about taking NYCB to the Soviet Union. His most acclaimed
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biographer Martin Dubermen does not discuss it, while Anne Searcy merely describes the change
as an ‘about-face’ of opinion. However, the evidence we have about Kirstein and Heath
Bowman’s talks in the ANTA meeting minutes suggests that Kirstein’s apparent change of heart
was part of some negotiation to allocate funds for NYCB to participate in another non-USSR
tour, likely to Japan. For example, the meeting minutes from the ANTA dance panel on March
16, 1961, state:
[Kirstein has] announced that they are interested in a tour to Russia…Mr.
Bowman again suggested a Latin American tour to Mr. Kirstein, but he was not
interested… They are planning to go to Manila on May 1st for three weeks, Japan
for six, and then Hong Kong and Singapore. They would also like to go to the
satellites and Moscow. 138
Perhaps then, his about-face was at least in part a compromise to secure his wish for
another visit to Japan by agreeing to a tour in Russia. If his two options for securing the Japan
trip were between visiting Latin America and the Soviet Union, he likely chose the latter because
of NYCB’s history of failure to impress Latin American audiences. When Balanchine and the
Ballet Caravan took his choreography to Latin America in 1941 for a ‘goodwill’ trip sponsored
by the Rockefellers, the tour amassed large box office deficits because South American
audiences considered Balanchine’s choreography not glamorous enough for ballet.139 Given the
two options, Kirstein likely considered the Soviet Union the better choice.
Members of the ANTA dance panel were not satisfied with such an agreement, worried
about the potential for failure in sending ballet to the Soviet Union. Since the start of the ballet
exchange, panelists worried that American ballet would not meet Russian standards and
subsequently fail to impress or inspire the Soviet people, best exemplified by a panelist’s remark
138
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during negotiations for ABT’s 1960 tour that “[b]ringing a ballet company to Russia is like
bringing a report card. It is of greater import than just having the company there.”140 Though
ABT had proved that the Soviets would not outright reject American ballet, this hesitancy
continued, with ANTA proposing the touring troupe Ballets: USA as their candidate to go behind
the Iron Curtain if the State Department insisted that American ballet must return to the USSR.
Though the group consisted of ballet dancers, its repertoire by Jerome Robbins relied heavily on
lighthearted, jazzy, and flashier fare that showed American ballet without becoming directly
comparable to the extremely high-brow Russian classics. Furthermore, because Robbins
frequently choreographed on NYCB, the panelists argued that sending his performing group was
equivalent to NYCB, without the hassle of organizing a trip for a large company and dealing
with the fact that George Balanchine was a defector of the Soviet Union.141 Therefore, panelists
felt it was a no-brainer to send Ballets: USA as it shared NYCB’s repertory, was smaller in size,
less expensive, and would bypass the concern of what to do with Balanchine, while presenting
ballet in a manner more centered on American popular culture.
The panelists did not get their way, with the State Department and Gostkoncert refusing
to use Ballets: USA in the exchange. The Gostkoncert rejected the troupe because of its use of
jazz, a sentiment in line with the Soviet’s general policy of oppression toward jazz music under
Khruschev. Therefore, it seemed to the State Department that Ballets: USA was entirely unusable
in the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future.142 Subsequently, ANTA acquiesced to the State
Department, and they agreed to make a formal recommendation on behalf of NYCB as the best
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candidate for the exchange. Notably, Japan dropped out of all discussion at this point,
presumably no longer a consideration by any party. On May 18, 1961, NYCB would be offered
to the Ministry of Culture as the company to tour the Soviet Union in the following ballet
exchange.
However in June 1961, the ballet exchange almost collapsed, and planning for the tour
was halted. That month the twenty-three-year-old soloist with the Kirov Ballet, Rudolf Nureyev,
defected from the Soviet Union. The incident was widely publicized due to Nureyev’s global
acclaim as one of the best male dancers of the century, making the front pages of major evening
papers in London and Paris right alongside reporting on the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in
Vienna.143 The Soviet Ministry of Culture and Gostkoncert were undoubtedly embarrassed, and
subsequently, negotiations became complicated with increased demands by both parties. Most
important of which was the fact that the Soviets now insisted on intensified presence from the
Soviet Committee for State Security, otherwise known as the KGB, for the cultural groups they
brought to the US, alarming the State Department that the Soviet government may be using tours
as an opportunity to steal American intelligence. 144 Luckily by the end of July, such tensions had
simmered down with Andrei Gromyko, the current Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, extending
an offer to the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk to further develop the exchange program
for the 1962-1963 agreement period.145
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Thus on March 8th of 1962, the exchange agreement for the 1962-1963 period was
signed. Section four of the agreement, the section pertaining to all performing arts exchanges,
included the exchange of NYCB for the Bolshoi Ballet.146 All that was left was for ANTA to
work out NYCB’s contract details and finance the event. However, there was another problem.
Balanchine and Kirstein had demurred from their previous offer, now claiming that they would
only go to the USSR if additional demands were met. Concerned by the rumors about the
significant undernourishment ABT dancers experienced in the Soviet Union in 1960, Balanchine
insisted that the company would not spend more than six weeks in the Soviet Union.147 He also
had reservations about going into the USSR as a Soviet defect, especially after the increased
tension because of Nureyev’s recent defection. Thus Balanchine said he would only go if the
State Department gave him “a Marine guard and a diplomatic passport.”148
Meanwhile, the two directors also claimed that NYCB would only visit the Soviet Union
if it were part of a more extensive European tour. In April of 1962, Balanchine announced this in
a meeting with the State Department, saying that “the only reason the company would accept the
Russian tour would be as a means of getting to the major capital cities of Europe.”149 This
statement was likely one from the heart. By 1962 Blalnchine had been a US citizen for
twenty-two years and was openly hostile to the Soviet system, making it known that he had no
interest in returning to the Soviet Union, stating in 1956, “I don’t ever want to see Russia
again.”150 To Balanchine, there was absolutely no benefit to returning unless he also got to return

146

Memorandum to Max Isenberg from Guy E. Coriden, March 8, 1962, MC 468, Box 50, Folder 75, Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
147
ANTA Dance Panel Meeting Minutes, April 17, 1962, MC 468, Box 101, Folder 17, Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
148
Duberman, The Worlds of Lincoln Kirstein, 550.
149
ANTA Dance Panel Meeting Minutes, April 17, 1962.
150
Quoted in Caute, The Dancer Defects, 491.

56

to the cities of Europe, who had watched him grow and develop as a choreographer since his
defection in 1924. Again, likely having abandoned any hope for a second tour to Japan, Kirstein
sided with Blanchine’s wish to revisit Europe as an absolute necessity.
One possibility for these sudden demands is that Kirstein and Balanchine now had the
upper hand in the negotiations. Following the official signing of the exchange agreement, the
State Department now had to follow through with sending a large ballet company to the Soviet
Union to maintain relations with the Soviet Ministry of Culture and Gostkoncert. Furthermore,
because Balanchine had refused to work with Nureyev after his defection, these Soviet agencies
were all the more eager for NYCB, making it unwise for the State Department to go back on
their offer with NYCB if they wanted to avoid political tension.151 Therefore, the State
Department could not outright reject any new demands Kirstein and Balanchine made because if
Kirstein refused to take the company once behind the Iron Curtain, there could be significant
fallout diplomatically between the two nations.
The State Department settled Balanchine’s first two demands quickly. They compromised
on seven weeks in the Soviet Union and promised Balanchine arrangements for him to have
diplomatic immunity as protection against any incidents during his visit.152 However, the
question of a European portion of the tour was more difficult. Unsurprisingly, the State
Department was incredibly reluctant to give out the approximately $80,000 in estimated funds to
accomplish such a tour.153 Consequently, they claimed that they could not promise total funding
for the European portion of the tour and that Kirstein should secure his own funding for the
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venture. Kirstein attempted to do this, amassing $20,000 by mid-April for the tour, but this was
not nearly enough to cover the estimated budget.154 Therefore, only months before the company’s
planned arrival, it was still entirely unclear if NYCB would go to the Soviet Union.
Ultimately, Sol Hurok financed the missing funds for NYCB. He donated to the company
over $25,000, on an agreement that any profits NYCB earned while in Europe go to ANTA and
not NYCB.155 On the surface, this move seemed out of character for the impresario who had been
feuding with Lincoln Kirstein since the 1930s. However, Hurok feared that if the NYCB tour in
the Soviet Union fell through, the Soviets would no longer send the Bolshoi to the US, meaning
a financial and reputational loss for himself.156 Thus, by financing the European leg of NYCB’s
tour, he ensured that he would have the Bolshoi in the US once again.
With Hurok’s aid in financing the European portion of the tour, plans for NYCB’s Soviet
debut became finalized. NYCB would leave for Western Europe in the summer of 1962,
Hamburg, Berlin, Zurich, Stuttgart, Cologne, Frankfurt, Vienna, for six weeks, followed by a
seven and half week stint in the Soviet Union with New York Times dance critic John Martin
reporting on the tour.157 While in the Soviet Union, the company would be accompanied by
officials from the Gostkoncert and American attache Hans Tuch to ensure productions went
smoothly. In exchange, the Bolshoi Ballet would embark on a three-month tour of the US and
Canada starting in September of 1962, stopping in New York, Los Angeles, Cleveland, San
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Francisco, Washington, Detroit, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Boston. In the US, the Bolshoi would
be placed in the care of Sol Hurok and a handful of KGB agents.
Each side would present their greatest hits in addition to new choreography. For the
Bolshoi Ballet, this meant presenting some of Petipa’s full-length classical ballets like Swan
Lake, Giselle (1842), and La Bayadere (1877), and turn of the century pieces like Fokine’s
Chopiniana (1909). Hoping to better relate to American culture, they also brought along Aram
Khachaturian’s Spartacus (1956), a balletic reimagination of the recent Hollywood blockbuster
hit by Stanley Kubrick of the same name.158 With these works, the Soviet Union hoped to
reassert itself to American audiences as the leader of ballet, thus the leader of the high art
cultural world.
Similarly, the State Department hoped that NYCB would impress upon Soviet audiences
the strength of the recently emerged American ballet scene. Though ABT had already presented
the core values of American ballet in their Soviet debut in 1960, their tour had been a washout
compared to the significant success the Bolshoi saw in the US in 1959. Accordingly, for the State
Department the stakes were even higher with this second attempt at making an impression in the
Soviet Union, hoping that Balanchine’s dominance in the American ballet scene as the epitome
of American “highbrow theatrical tastes” would make a more lasting impression on Soviet
audiences than ABT did. 159 Subsequently, the State Department became more involved than ever
before in the choreographic choices ANTA made for the company.
However, ANTA and the State Department had to contend with many factors in making
these choices. First, there was the issue of logistics. For obvious reasons, the panel and State
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Department agreed that the company could not take along any ballets that involved children,
eliminating two of Balanchine’s full-length hits, The Nutcracker and A Midsummer Night’s
Dream (1962). They both also believed it essential that the repertoire reflect NYCB’s American
aesthetics and not Balanchine’s Russian heritage, eliminating his reproductions of the Russian
classics like Firebird and Swan Lake (1951).160
They also had to contend with the Gostkoncert’s opinion on which ballets were morally
acceptable for Soviet audiences. After Andrei Gromyko and Dean Rusk officially signed off on
the exchange agreement, two Gostkoncert officials flew to the US to weigh in on an acceptable
repertoire for the company to bring to the USSR. Though ANTA and the State Department were
concerned that Balanchine’s abstraction would not be accessible to Soviet audiences, eliminating
Episodes (1959) for its dissonant score and avant-garde nature, the Gostkoncert officials
approved Balanchine’s equally abstract work Agon (1957).161 Instead, the officials rejected pieces
with particularly explicit themes of sex and violence, such as Balanchine’s Orpheus (1948) and
Jerome Robbins The Cage (1951).162 Ultimately, the Gostkoncert approved a five program
repertoire for the company to perform in the Soviet Union designed by ANTA and the State
Department to showcase the wide array of narrative and non-narrative work NYCB performed.163
With the repertoire set, negotiations for the tour finally concluded. Finally securing
NYCB in the Soviet Union for the State Department was surely an insurmountable win. They
finally had the opportunity to showcase the company they believed best represented American
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values to the Soviet Union. As another step in the overall Cultural Cold War, they hoped that the
presence of Balanchine and his company in the USSR would inspire Soviet audiences and artists,
convincing them that the West was superior in the arts and inspiring them to rebel against the
Soviet regime. In NYCB, the State Department thus saw an opportunity to weaponize ballet and
bring down communism. But for Kirstein, Balanchine, and NYCB, this trip was simply another
opportunity to capitalize on the Cold War for the company’s benefit. Ultimately, they agreed to
go to the Soviet Union as a means to return to Europe and hopefully increase the company’s
global audience and prestige abroad.
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Chapter 4
New York City Ballet’s Soviet Debut

On October 6th, 1962, the members of the New York City Ballet landed on the Moscow
tarmac. Three nights later, the company made its debut performance in the Soviet Union on the
grand Bolshoi Theater stage– the first American dance company to ever receive such an honor. 164
The theater, built in 1856, was a historical treasure and one of the few buildings in Moscow still
standing that preserved the luxuriousness of the Tsars, with its decadent curtains draped in red
and gold velvet and enormous size; the stage alone was about three times the size of the stage
NYCB performed on back in New York. 165 On this anticipated opening night, the entire theater
sold out in advance. Several seats belonged to diplomats whose presence, as Lincoln Kirstein
described it, was “required by protocol, not by passion, the hardest audience in the world to
melt.”166 The remainder of the audience was no easier to woo. John Martin of the New York
Times wrote, “[t]he Russian audience is an altogether honest one. It applauds furiously when it is
moved to do so, and it sits in absolute silence when it is not so moved.”167 Performing four
ballets, Serenade (1935), Interplay (1945), Agon (1957), and Western Symphony (1954), the
company was put to the task of winning this critical crowd over with their ‘American’ spirit,
setting the mood for the entirety of the tour.
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The company faced significant challenges in its debut evening. First, the dancers were
exhausted by their roundabout journey to the Soviet Union. They had already spent six weeks
touring the metropolitan centers of Western Europe before they arrived in Moscow. During this
earlier portion of the tour, company members suffered multiple injuries, including some of
NYCB’s star dancers. Principal dancer Jacques d’Amboise got hit by a car in Hamburg, breaking
some of his ribs, and Melissa Hayden had gone to the hospital for back problems. Second, some
feared that the Soviet audience would dislike the program set for opening night; three of the four
works lacked scenery or props, none possessed any distinct narrative, and one, Agon, was set to
an atonal score and performed in practice clothes, something Soviet audiences had never
experienced before. Nevertheless, most remained optimistic, with dance critic Allen Hughes
writing that if their “luck in the Soviet Union is as good as in Europe, the tour will have been a
grand success, if not an untroubled one.”168

Fig. 4.1 The audience of opening night in the Bolshoi Theater. Published in Francisco Moncion,
“The Friday Report: Letters from NYC Ballet Abroad.,” Dance Magazine, December 1962, 20.
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In the end the evening was indeed a success, though not because of luck alone. With the
conclusion of the first ballet, Serenade, NYCB seemed doomed to fail as the audience sat
“perplexed and fairly indifferent.”169 Nonetheless, as the evening progressed, the dynamic in the
theater began to change. With the pas de deux from Agon, the third ballet of the evening, a
glimmer of enthusiasm could be felt from the audience. By the time the curtain fell on the final
ballet of the night, Western Symphony, “Mr. Balanchine was at the center of the greatest
ovation.”170 The diplomats acted tepidly, and the critics the following day expressed neutral
reviews, but for anyone who was there that night, it felt like something extraordinary had just
occurred.171 The night was over, and it had been won.
Opening night in Moscow set the tone for the entire tour. Throughout NYCB’s journey
across the Soviet Union the troupe’s successes were complicated by political forces that shaped
both the company’s understanding of the Soviet Union, and Soviet understanding of NYCB.
Rather than account for the entire tour narratively, this chapter teases out various points of
inquiry that define these relationships and ultimately asks “was the tour a success?” By asking
this question one begins to uncover evidence for who benefited more from a Cold War dance
exchange program, the State Department or NYCB.
***
NYCB was one of the largest foreign performing arts companies to perform in the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, consisting of approximately ninety persons total including sixty-two
dancers (the youngest of whom were only fifteen years old), three orchestral conductors, the
company’s stage crew, electricians, wardrobe personnel, a company doctor, a chaperone for the
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younger dancers, along with company administrator Betty Cage, New York Times dance critic
John Martin, company directors Lincoln Kirstein and George Balanchine, and various State
Department personnel. Upon arrival, Gostkoncert representatives and an orchestra of 60 Soviet
musicians accompanied the troupe around the Soviet Union.172 The tour consisted of
performances in Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Baku over seven and half weeks,
“selling” Balanchine’s brand of American ballet.” 173 They spent the most time in Moscow,
performing for three weeks in both the Bolshoi Theater and Kremlin Palace of Congresses,
followed by ten days in Leningrad and a week at each of the remaining destinations.

Fig 4.2 New York City Ballet dancers and staff in the Soviet Union, 1962. Published in
Naima Prevots, Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War (Middletown,
CT. 06459, UNITED STATES: Wesleyan University Press, 1999), 84-5.

The company performed a broad repertoire consisting of eighteen ballets divided into five
programs. Sixteen of the eighteen ballets were choreographed by George Balanchine, the
remaining two by Jerome Robbins, with Robbins’ Interplay being the only piece previously
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performed in the Soviet Union by ABT in 1960. The ballets performed were stylistically diverse,
ranging from story ballets to thematic and nationalistic pieces to entirely abstract work.174
One would imagine that the ballets that retained a distinct narrative would have been
easiest for Soviet audiences to digest. The pieces Prodigal Son (1929), La Sonnambula (1946),
La Valse (1951), and the pas de deux from Midsummer Night’s Dream all presented clear
narratives, while other works like Serenade displayed a sense of narrative without directly
presenting a plot in the dancing. As part of a full-length narrative work based on a Shakespeare
play and choreographically similar to classical ballets in construction, Midsummer Night’s Dream
might seem likely to earn favor from Soviet audiences. Ironically, the pas de deux was not
originally in the programs brought to the Soviet Union; it was only after a few nights of
lukewarm reactions in Moscow that Balanchine approached Jacques d’Amboise, asking if he felt
comfortable doing the ballet to a piano accompaniment. By a stroke of luck, d’Amboise carried
around the orchestra scores to the ballet, and so it was performed with full orchestration later that
week.175
However, the one ballet to most clearly and immediately capture favor from audiences
and press alike contained no narrative at all; Symphony in C (1947). Set to Georges Bizet’s
symphony, the piece is divided into four movements. Balanchine’s choreography preserves
thematic material from each movement, transposing into the next with the addition of more
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dancers to match Bizet’s introduction of new instruments, a choreographic technique reminiscent
of choreographic symphonist practices in the 1920s.176 While this use of music to guide the
choreography sits in opposition to dramballet, the way the piece builds intensity that is eclipsed
in its grand finale parallels Petipa’s choreographic style. Furthermore, by being set to Bizet, part
of a canon of composers including Prokofiev and Tchaikovsky, seen as appropriate for Soviet
ballet aesthetics, made the work more publicly acceptable.177 These factors made the ballet easily
recognizable and politically safe to enjoy.
It is no surprise then that the public reviews on Symphony in C were the most positive of
Balanchine as a choreographer. John Martin went so far as to claim that the ballet was the sole
factor in turning audiences from cordial to raving in Moscow. In his reporting he wrote about the
premiere of Symphony in C at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, asserting that before this
premiere the audience was still ‘adjusting’ to “repertory made up entirely of dancing shaped
along musical lines and without drama or spectacle.”178 Ultimately, “the point at which the tide of
understanding turned occurred... [was] with the presentation of the Bizet “Symphony in C,” and
“the Bizet work brought forth not only applause throughout and repeated curtain calls at the end
but also the rhythmic cries of “Bal-an-chine” until the choreographer was forced to come
forward.”179 Meanwhile, Bernard Taper, Balanchine’s biographer, asserted:
Nearly all Russian critics who saw it agreed that Symphony in C was sheer joy– “a
life-affirming” ballet, as Golovashenko hailed it, “a true festival of dancing...agile
and light, diversified and wonderfully harmonious.” Even Petipa, wrote one,
could not have invented such a breathtaking display of classical choreography as
Balanchine had done in this work.180
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Another favorite with Soviet audiences was Western Symphony. Set to American folk
tunes by Hershey Kay, the ballet explores a romanticized vision of the American West.
Balanchine uses traditional ballet vocabulary in the piece, “but he infused them with the
formations and gestures of American folk dancing.” 181 While the ballet has no storyline, dance
historian Andrea Harris argues that it constructs a deliberate historical narrative about the
genealogy of Western classism, using parody that “playfully defied the boundaries of both
history and narrative.”182 In other words, despite its glaring nationalism, the ballet’s comedic
portrayal of the Wild West made it palatable to even the most devout followers of Soviet
communism. It carved out a space where its nationalism could be interpreted as a mockery of
capitalist society through its tongue-in-cheek approach to representing the American West. 183
This ambiguity of pro-Americanism versus comedy appealed to an audience interested in
American culture but unable to support said culture publicly.
Furthermore, ABT’s tour to the Soviet Union had already set a precedent for themes of
the Wild West in ballet as an appropriate choice for Soviet audiences. When ABT presented
Agnes de Mille’s Rodeo (1942), another western ballet, the piece received favorable reviews
from the Soviets. Unlike Western Symphony, this ballet contains a story about a cowgirl’s
struggle for love in the Wild West set in a partially comedic, partially critical tone. Despite this
main difference, the two share many stylistic elements to convince the State Department that
Western Symphony would be received similarly to Rodeo.184 This assumption proved correct in
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terms of audience response. During a recorded performance for Soviet television, the audience
can be heard applauding rhythmically to the female lead’s solo, a sign of admiration in Russian
dance culture.185
However, reviews of Western Symphony did not express the same admiration for the work
that audiences did. For instance, the Russian ballet critic Anna Illupina described the piece in the
English newspaper publication Moscow News as simple choreography to an unsophisticated tune,
in which its “vulgarity eclipsed its humor and classical foundation,” likely in reference to the fact
that the ballet features couples hanging off one another is a saloon setting, suggesting
drunkenness and sexual intimacy.186 She claims that audience applause to the performance was
deduced to “the customary hospitality of our audiences,” meaning that the positive audience
reception of the piece was exemplary of Soviet courtesy and not a sign of actual enjoyment.187
It is essential to consider that Illupina’s dismissal of the ballet as ‘vulgar’ does not extend
to criticizing the company as a whole. In this manner, Illupina’s review is illustrative of the
general tendencies of reviewing pieces of the tour in the Soviet press. Soviet dance critics mainly
were positive in their review of the troupe, especially in their comments on individual dancers. In
particular, the male dancers were subject to great fanfare, especially principal dancers Arthur
Mitchell and Edward Villella. The former was often greeted on stage with cries of “Meet-shell”
from audience members, and the latter begged by Soviet audiences to do encores of his
variations.188 The women in the company also received compliments. For instance, Illupina’s
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review described Melissa Hayden as spirited with beautiful lines and Suki Schorer “as small and
graceful as our Katya Maksimova, who is being so gratefully admired now by the Americans.” 189
Such unanimous approval of the dancers themselves was not surprising. NYCB came to the
Soviet Union with many of its most famous performers to date; stars in their prime on the trip
included Jacques d’Amboise, Melissa Hayden, Allegra Kent, Patricia McBride, Edward Villella,
Violette Verdi, Arthur Mitchell, and others. Two rising stars, Kay Mazzo and Susan Farrell were
also present.
In general Soviet art critics also spoke kindly of the company’s repertoire, though with
two distinctive caveats. The first common objection was an insistence that some of Balanchine’s
choreography displayed problematic behavior. In particular, ballets like Western Symphony that
displayed provocations of sex and alcholhol use were deemed morally problematic in the press.
The second was the frequent claim that Balanchine’s work only translated the superficial features
of a score, failing to consider the emotional and intellectual content of the music, especially in
his non-narrative work. Indeed looking at the reviews collectively, one can more or less divide
them by if their strongest objection is to morals or abstraction.190 The former, led by dancer and
critic Mikhail Gabovich’s work in Sovetskaya Kultura (Soviet Culture), considered Balanchine’s
vivid embodiment of the music in his choreography a form of understandable content but was
hesitant to approve of the connotations they saw in this content, particularly sexuality.191 The
latter, the most extreme being Rostislav Zakharov in Vechernyaya Moskva (Evening Moscow),
emphasized their objection to the lack of narrative content in Balanchine’s work, which negated
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any appreciation of Balanchine’s innovations in ballet.192 Despite these two distinct camps for
reasons to reject the company’s repertoire, the reviews otherwise largely shared the same
opinions about the company.
The fact that we see this consistency across reviews by various critics proves that the
Soviet censorship system played a large part in creating these reviews. The formation of a
censorship apparatus in government was instituted in the early years of the Soviet Union,
evolving with each First Secretary of the Communist Party. In Khrushchev’s cultural thaw, the
main arm of Soviet censorship of the press, the Main Administration of Literature and
Publishing, otherwise known as Glavit, experienced a shrinking authority.193 Nevertheless, this
diminishing power of Glavit did not result in an expansion of freedom of speech within the press.
Instead, the top-down chain of censorship went through other organs such as the Ministry of
Culture and even the editors themselves through self-censorship.194 In this way, the censorship
process became less formalized yet still omnipotent in the 1960s.
In 2011 Elizabeth Souritz, dance historian and one of the Soviet reviewers of the 1962
NYCB tour, confirmed that censorship played a critical role in the publication of critiques about
the tour in her article titled “Balanchine in Russia.” She writes that the guidelines of an
acceptable review were never explicitly given to her or others through a political body. Instead,
the official newspaper of the Communist Party Pravda’s publication on the debut performance of
NYCB in the Soviet Union set a precedent for acceptable review language of the troupe for other
writers. According to Souritz, Pravda’s review language set the following pattern:
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[Y]ou had to remember that they were official guests. At the same time there was
the Soviet ideology to be taken into consideration. You had to impress upon the
reader that here was something not as good as our own product...[Y]ou could
praise the dancers, even say that the choreographer was skillful in imagining
movements, especially if you stressed that he has been brought up “in the great
Russian tradition,” but you should criticize him for adhering to the plotless kind
of ballet.195
Notably, in her reflection of the piece she wrote in the Soviet journal Teatr about NYCB,
she claims that most of the statements she made criticizing the company were beliefs she
genuinely held at that time. Her experience suggests that for most dance critics in the Soviet
Union in 1962, Soviet ideology imbued art critique so heavily that they genuinely believed “that
really was the way they thought” about the company.196 It was only in the late 1980s, when
Balanchine ballets began to be danced by Russia’s own companies that Souritz came to embrace
Balanchine’s choreography.197 From this personal example, one sees how these formulaic
reviews on the company presented a prescribed attitude toward the troupe as part of diplomatic
exchange achieved through self-censorship and reveal the indoctrinating qualities censorship had
on art critics at the time.
Within this formula for reviewing NYCB, three ballets stand out for the way critics
described them. The first was Symphony in C, which critics heralded as a unanimous success for
reasons already described earlier in this chapter. The other two were Balanchine’s most
avant-garde pieces brought on the tour, Agon and Episodes, which the Soviet Press utterly
rejected. Set to serialist scores, featuring ‘geometric’ movement, and performing in practice
clothes made these pieces far removed from the grandness of classical ballet or heroics of
dramballet. The American Embassy, aware of the difference between these two pieces and the
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ballets that frequented the Bolshoi Theater and the Mariinsky, marketed both works by
de-emphasizing their abstractionism. For instance, Agon was described simply as ‘difficult’ in a
Russian language souvenir booklet, and Stravinsky’s score was related to seventeenth-century
music rather than highlighting the serial composition.198
Despite the embassy’s strategic marketing of these two ballets, the press reviewed these
two works most harshly out of the entire repertoire. Reviewers observed that these pieces were
cold and devoid of emotion, impressive only in their ability to handle complex serialist scores.
For instance, dance critic Boris L’vov-Anokhin described Agon as “the audacious ‘fission of an
atomic nucleus’ in dance… not art if we take that to be the expression of living human
emotions.”199 Meanwhile, in a review of Episodes, critic and historian Natalia Roslavleva said,
“even in the atomic age, the subject of art will be man,” suggesting the inhuman unemotionaly
nature of the piece made it not true art.200
In all likelihood, these more extreme attacks on Agon and Episodes likely relate to
Khrushchev’s general distaste for abstraction and American art. On December 1, 1962, the first
secretary attended the 30 Years of the Moscow Artists’ Union art exhibition at the Moscow
Central Exhibition Hall. The day is now infamous for the leader’s rant on the abysmal ‘filth’ and
‘sexual deviance’ of the works not in the social realist style. He furthermore ranted about his
distaste for American-based music and dance style, claiming “[w]hen I hear jazz, it’s like gas on
the stomach,” and “these new dances which are so fashionable…are completely improper.”201
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Though this incident now known as the Manege Affair occurred after NYCB’s visit, these
statements help explain two things. First, this expressed distaste explains why the premier never
saw a single performance by the NYCB while they visited the Soviet Union, choosing instead to
watch American Opera star Jerome Hines perform on October 23. 202 Second, Khrushchev’s
assertion at the exhibition that “[m]y opinion is the same as the people” fundamentally dictated
the beliefs of the press.203 His assertion clarifies that he was the Soviet art critic, and therefore his
judgment represented the people’s judgment. Taking these facts into account, it becomes clear
that a favorable review of Balanchine’s most abstract productions on tour was out of the
question. After all, if Khrushchev’s taste represents the taste of all, and he refused even to see the
company perform, then it was ideologically impossible to speak too favorably about NYCB,
particularly its most avant-garde works.
The only part of these two ballets not dismissed outright in the press was the pas de deux
in Agon. Lincoln Kirstein surmised about a decade after the tour that this exception emerged
from a reading of the pas de deux “as a metaphor of inequality in American society” that
displayed the submission of the enslaved male to the tyranny of his white mistress.204 While
Balanchine denied any metaphorical meanings in his works, this is an interpretation that dance
scholars like Sally Banes have adopted, arguing that Mitchel’s manipulation of his partner’s body
and vice versa offers a forbidden eroticism between Mitchel as a black man and his partner, a
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white woman.205 Perhaps then Soviets were interested in the piece as a lense into the classism
and racism of American society.

Fig. 4.3 Allegra Kent and Arthur Mitchell in the pas de deux from Agon in Moscow, 1962.
Published in Anne Searcy, Ballet In The Cold War: A Soviet-American Exchange (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2020), 122.

Though I have not found any explicit evidence that the Soviets understood the pas de
deux in this way, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Soviet interest in Mitchell as an artist
played a role in the response. For instance, compliments of the pas de deux in critics’ reviews
primarily focused on their admiration for Arthur Mitchell in this role. In one particularly
pertinent example, L’vov-Anokhin praises Mitchell’s ability to achieve “the laborious thinking
out of form...extremely strained and complex, but at the same time natural and therefore
excellent” in an otherwise scathing review of the ballet.206 Meanwhile, Mitchell himself admitted
in an interview in 2012 reflecting on the tour that Soviet audiences seemed excited to watch him
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because “they had never seen a black man dancing ballet” before.207 Such comments suggest that
Soviet audiences may have found the piece interesting because of some juxtaposition of their
interest in Mitchell as a man of color and as an incredibly talented artist.
While the highly abstractionist aesthetics of Agon and Episodes were rejected in an
official capacity, in reality Soviet audiences had a range of opinions about Agon and Episodes.
As Solomon Volkov remembered:
Older people rejected it: ‘The Americans aren’t dancing; they’re solving algebra
problems with their feet.’ But the young saw in Balanchine’s productions the
heights that cultural avant-garde could have reached if it had not been crushed by
Soviet authorities. Leningrad’s aspiring musicians, writers, and dancers were
inspired.208
This statement brings two points about Soviet dance and cultural politics to light. First,
considering Volkov’s assertion against the backdrop of censorship that plagued reviews of the
company tour, one is reminded of the bifurcation between the official government-sanctioned
representation of Soviet artistic taste and the unpublicized opinions of the people. While
Kruschev’s government remained traditional in terms of artistic value, by 1962, it was clear that
Soviet people, on the whole, were trending towards the experimental. Unorthodox poetry
readings were drawing in crowds in the thousands, and in February of 1962, the art critic Mikhail
Alpatov went so far as to write a public review defending abstraction in Soviet painting.209
Therefore, in Volkov’s assertion here, one finds the evidence that, in other arts and literature, the
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general population may have been more open to Balanchine’s abstraction than the Soviet press
would lead one to believe.
Second, Volkov’s assertion suggests that these avant-garde pieces represented a future of
artistic innovation in ballet that Soviet youth found pleasurable and inspirational. By the
mid-1950s, Russian ballet was facing choreographic stagnation. Subsequently, the Ministry of
Culture urged companies like the Kirov and Bolshoi to create new works that emphasized
communist values and attracted youth, breaking with the dramballet style.210 As Pierre Bourdieu
has observed, stylistic breaks in culture often lead to the rediscovery of abandoned artistic trends,
which in the case of the Soviet Union meant a return to choreographic symphonism, a style in
which the choreography was determinant of the music rather than the ballet’s plot.211
Accordingly, new Soviet productions began utilizing music the same way Balanchine had done
at the start of his choreographic career, matching musical themes with designated movement
vocabularies.
While Balanchine experimented with using this music movement relationship to pursue
the abstract, Soviet choreographic symphonists in the 1950s and 1960s had to retain narrative in
their work to accommodate the values prescribed to ballet by the Ministry of Culture. In other
words, Soviet choreography could never go beyond a partial renewal of choreographic
symphonism and experiment with Balanchine’s level of abstractionism because they were
restrained by the need to present pro-communist narratives in their work, but could use
Balanchine’s aesthetics to inspire narrative pieces.212 Perhaps this is why Suki Schorer recalled in
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conversation with me that it was not “just Balanchine’s choreography that the Russians enjoyed...
it was seeing their technique used in new, different ways than what they were used to, that
connection made us familiar [to them].”213 In this manner, these two ballets effectively sold
American ballet to a generation of young dancers and choreographers, meeting the State
Department’s aspiration for the trip to demonstrate American cultural achievements in a manner
that influences political attitudes and actions.
Certainly, if one relied only on John Martin’s reporting of the trip, it would seem that
every performance had this sort of effect on the Soviet people. At each destination, the dance
critic purports a newfound understanding of American ballet from audiences. In Moscow, he
wrote, “[t]he whole final series at the Bolshoi has been marked not only by enthusiasm but also
by a large measure of fresh and welcoming understanding of [Balanchine’s] new aspect of the
ballet art.”214 In Leningrad, the audience was “warmly responsive from beginning to end,” and
that “it is fair to believe the choreography in Leningrad will never quite be the same again” after
seeing NYCB perform.215 Success in Kyiv exceeded both the Russian cities right from the start,
with its audience “although largely official in character, quite evidently enjoyed immensely. It
was, indeed, by far the most enthusiastic first night, outdoing even Leningrad in that respect.”216
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZy52UVZk3. One such example is Igor Belsky’s Leningrad Symphony (1961).
The ballet uses Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony to create movements eerily reminiscent of Balanchine’s
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Moreover, in Tbilisi, the audience was also wildly receptive to Balanchine as a fellow Georgian,
offering “prolonged cheering” with each performance.217 From such receptiveness, as told by
Martin, it seems overwhelmingly clear that the company had effectively proved the validity and
superiority of the American Ballet.
However, the success of the dancers and repertoire aside, Balanchine’s attitude during the
tour became an immediate problem for Soviet US relations. When a Russian radio interviewer
welcomed Balanchine to the home of classical ballet, he responded, “Russia is the home of
romantic ballet. The home of classic ballet is now in America.” 218 Balanchine is a notoriously
difficult personality to understand, as he never kept any writings explaining his philosophies, and
rarely did he ever expand on his statements verbally after the fact. Perhaps he was likening his
development of ballet in America to Petipa’s evolution of ballet in Tsarist Russia. Such an
assertion would suggest that Balanchine was also comparing the Soviet Union to France during
Petipa’s most prolific period as a nation in a state of artistic decline.
Balanchine’s abrasiveness to the Soviet Union was continuous for the duration of the
tour. Notably, he refused to cooperate with the Ministry of Culture functionaries. The
functionaries had advised Balanchine not to repeat Episodes after its initial debut, stating that
first, the Gostkoncert had not approved the ballet, and second, the ballet was not suitable for
Soviet audiences as they may “consider it inappropriate...they would not understand and
therefore not appreciate it.”219 According to handler Hans Tuch who was present during the
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interaction, Balanchine calmly retorted in Russian, “[expletive] your experts.”220 Surprisingly,
Tuch does not elaborate on any political consequences the moment may have had in his memoir,
instead debating if the functionaries were right about the ballet.
Meanwhile, the choreographer also frequently told Soviet reporters that his ballets were
superior to those performed in Russia because they better addressed the beauty of dance through
abstraction. When asked about his purpose in taking NYCB to Moscow, Balanchine said he
wanted to “acquaint Soviet viewers with the distinctive features of American dance, with our
quests and our discoveries. After all, art...should always live and grow,” implying that
communism was to blame for the lack of innovation in Russian ballet in recent years.221 Again,
though Tuch mentions Balanchine’s hostility toward the press he does not elaborate on what
consequences it had. This nonchalance about Balanchine’s outbursts from Tuch and other
accounts of diplomats present during the tour begs the question: was Balanchine’s rejection of
the Soviet Union beneficial to the tour’s political objective of selling American high art?
It is well established that the company dancers were obliged to remain apolitical in
appearance, but it is unclear what expectations the State Department had for Balanchine.222 His
statements in the press may have been interpreted as beneficial for the State Department, for his
frequent assertions about his success in America offered proof that choreographers thrived in the
very capitalist society Soviet press so often dismissed as incapable of producing quality culture.
Furthermore, his status as an Americanohile kept the Soviet press from justifying the company’s
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success because Balanchine was born in Russia, though the press circled the problem by
indicating that his years of study in the Mariinsky are what gave Balanchine the tools to become
a choreographer. Indeed, Russian reviewers felt the need to address Balanchine’s statements in
their commentary, indicating that they were “an integral component of Balanchine’s appearance
in the Soviet Union.”223 Thus there must have been at least some fear within the Soviet Union’s
political bodies that Balanchine’s public persona was effectively causing doubt about the
purported superiority of Russian ballet.
Although Balanchine was combative toward the press and Soviet officials, this severe
distaste for the Soviets seemed to soften for fellow artists. NYCB had daily company classes
taught by Balanchine in Moscow and Leningrad at the Bolshoi and Kirov schools. Russian
teachers and students often watched and took notes during these classes, even recording the
classes for future analysis in some instances.224 In these more intimate moments, Balanchine was
by all accounts cordial. He seemed to genuinely want to teach his methodologies on ballet to
them. He was equally cordial when meeting with his former classmates from his youth in
Leningrad, though d’Amboise remembers Balanchine admitting later that he “had to be nice”
when discussing their choreography, implying that he was not a fan of their work.225
The choreographer was also appreciative of his newfound fans in Russia. In Leningrad,
he orchestrated a free performance for the artists of the city, in which Balanchine made a speech
to artists saying, “in troubling times which we may share in time to come, try to think of us as we
are tonight; we’ll try to think of you as you are tonight!”226 This statement encapsulates the
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humility and respect Balanchine undoubtedly had for the artist community he had left behind so
long ago. His actions suggest that he felt compassion for his fellow artists’ circumstances and
genuinely wanted to influence their lives for the better.

Fig 4.4 Left: New York City Ballet dancers take company class in a rehearsal hall in Leningrad.
The hall is part of the former Imperial Theater School, where Balanchine studied ballet as a
child. Right: Balanchine talking with teachers of the Vaganova Academy in Leningrad. Published
in Bernard Taper, Balanchine: A Biography, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1996), 285; 287.

Nevertheless, the strain of being in Russia proved to be too much to handle for
Balanchine. Returning to Russia met a return to the family Balanchine left behind when he
defected in 1924, his brother Andrei. Andrei had become a successful composer in the
intervening years, a point that proved to create a strain in the brothers' relationship after some
forty-three years apart. They were aware of each other’s lives via their dance choreography and
music composition successes, respectively, but they never corresponded during their separation.
When they reconnected, Andrei wanted his brother to create a ballet to one of his scores, but
Balanchine did not like the music. As a result, the discussions over this matter caused their
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relationship to become increasingly precarious to the point that Balanchine no longer wanted to
see Andrei. 227
Balanchine also feared being in Russia as a defector. Although part of the conditions for
the 1962 tour stipulated Balanchine’s guaranteed safety, the choreographer often spoke to his
companions of a feeling of ‘being watched,’ and often dreamed of being captured by the KGB. 228
According to principal dancer Patricia Neary, Balanchine “couldn’t sleep at night; he told me the
phone would ring at four o’clock in the morning, and the radio would go on suddenly. He got
thinner and thinner.”229 Though the presence of surveillance that he felt was likely real, the
contract with the International Cultural Exchange Service of American National Theater and
Academy mentions that participants should expect that their hotel rooms are bugged; it is
unlikely that he faced any real danger.230 There is no substantial evidence to suggest that the
KGB had any intention to kidnap and retain Balanchine, especially when doing so would be a
clear break of the contract between the two foreign powers putting the Bolshoi Ballet, which was
touring the US simultaneously to NYCB’s tour, in danger.
Nevertheless, these confounding factors lead the choreographer to spiral into a depression
early in the tour. From opening night, d’Amboise noted in his diary that Balanchine seemed
depressed.231 Moreover, the success of winning over Leningrad audiences, which many observers
have considered one of the most outstanding achievements of his career, Balanchine insisted
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meant nothing to him.232 Ultimately because of his rapidly deteriorating mental health, NYCB
administrator Betty Cage made the arrangements to fly Balanchine back to New York for a
week’s respite before joining the tour at the end of their engagement in Kyiv. According to Tuch,
“when Balanchine had to return briefly to New York, the company practically fell apart.
Everything went wrong during the performances…[but] the minute Balanchine came back,
everything returned to near-perfection.”233 However, this is likely an exaggeration, for I have
found no mention of the company struggling significantly during Balanchine’s absence in other
accounts from individuals on tour.
While the troupe’s ability to stay composed through the breakdown and departure of their
artistic leader already speaks volumes to its tenacity, what is all the more remarkable is how little
chaos ensued amidst the Cuban Missile Crisis. On October 18th, Edward Villella broke the
company contract because he was “literally forced” to repeat his solo in Donizetti Variations by
an audience so enamored that they refused to stop applauding until he danced once more. That
same evening, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko denied the existence of Soviet missiles in
Cuba, and the embassy informed Kirstein and Cage of the potential immediate danger the
company now faced.234 Subsequently, they began working on a plan of escape from the Kremlin
guard. Ironically, they were more or less psychologically prepared for the crisis thanks to a game
the two played leading up to the tour they titled “Disaster,” in which one would pose a what-if
scenario, and the other would have a limited time to pose a solution.235
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Ultimately, Cage and Kirstein formulated three plans that they shared with some senior
members of the company. Plan A was to charter a plane if the embassy warned of oncoming
terror, plan B to use the tour bus to take the dancers to the US embassy and wait out there, and
plan C was to do nothing. Some years later, Betty Cage elaborated to d’Amboise, “the Bolshoi
Ballet company is touring America. They care about their dancers. Maybe our state department
will too, then we’ll get traded.”236 In actuality, plans A and B were nothing but a wish. Rocky
Staples, the troupe’s cultural attache, informed Kirstein that the embassy had no authority or
responsibility for the company in the event of a crisis. Likely, the embassy could not assist
because they were also stranded during those intense thirteen days. When the crisis started,
almost all American diplomats and their families had been restricted to Moscow by Soviet
authorities. Subsequently, information regarding the crisis became confusing and restricted;
messages from the US government to the embassy were delayed, and press coverage of the crisis
inside Moscow was heavily censored.237 Ironically, some reported that “the most talked-about
event in Moscow during the week of the crisis was the opening of the New York City Ballet,” not
US-Soviet relations.238
Despite the lack of information and general terror amongst members in the embassy,
Cage, and Kirstein all maintained a united front for the company, ensuring their safety. The
embassy, in particular, became a source of guidance and comfort, providing bulletins updating
the dancers on world events and forwarding letters from their families. During the crisis, the
embassy was the one to warn the dancers and staff not to go out on October 27th because of a
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government-planned protest that was to take place outside the embassy. According to Kirstein,
the event was “not wildly impressive.”239 Ultimately, the protest dissipated quickly and
peacefully, and the Cuban Missile Crisis had little effect on the company.
Indeed there were only two instances on the tour in which the dancers found themselves
in any real danger. The first instance revolved around one of the company’s younger members,
Kay Mazzo, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During one of the protests against the US embassy,
Ms. Mazzo was burned by a protester putting out a cigarette on her arm as she left the embassy.
In an interview with historian Clare Croft, Mazzo claimed that, in retrospect, the incident was not
a big deal, but that at the time, it seriously scared her and her friends.240 The second occurred
after the Cuban Missile Crisis had settled down. Dancer Shawn O’Brien found himself in trouble
when Soviet police took him into custody for the use of a video camera in a public park in Kyiv.
He was eventually released, though Hans Tuch was appalled that it took such a long time for the
Soviet police to notify US authorities of his arrest.241 Taken into custody in the early morning, the
dancer had gone missing without a trace, causing him to miss his performance that evening. He
was only released with his confiscated materials after he and Tuch convinced his captors that the
films he took were purely artistic quandaries.242 Once he returned, O’Brien took the liberty to
recount the questioning he received and how the police had ransacked his hotel room, looking for
evidence of a conspiracy. For Lincoln Kirstein, the incident led him to decide to leave the tour
early, meaning that once again, the company found itself without one of its key leaders for a
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portion of the tour.243 Despite these dangerous incidents and lack of leadership, the tour
continued without missing a single performance.
The ballet dancers of NYCB were uniquely well equipped to handle the pressures of
dancing in enemy territory at the height of the Cold War. Their lifestyles made them accustomed
to tuning out the stressors beyond ballet; daily rehearsals for hours on end allowed little time to
experience the world events unfolding around them. After years of dedicated training, their focus
was on themselves, not the political agendas around them.244 To this end, it explains why the
dancers who have recorded their experiences on the 1962 tour seem to remember issues
pertaining to their physical bodies in much more detail than the political climate in the Soviet
Union. In interviews with company members who participated in the 1962 tour, they freely speak
of the conditions of the hotels they stayed in, the food they ate, and the injuries they retained but
have little to say about the Cuban Missile Crisis or even politics at all. For instance, Robert
Moriano, who was only sixteen at the time of the tour, remembers Tbilisi, not for the relationship
locals seemed to have with Soviet politics but because it was where he learned to shave, while
Carol Sumner’s most prominent memory of the tour was her discovery of Spam as a cure for
what the dancers called “Moscow tummy.”245 In my own interview with Suki Schroer, Ms.
Schroer could not recall if she ever felt scared being in the Soviet Union during the Cuban
Missile Crisis but remembered Hans Tuch as the man who gave the dancers peanut butter.246
These memories all attest that the dancers were much more concerned about their performances
than the status of global affairs.
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Interestingly, for both NYCB dancers and Soviet dancers, the tour was a sight of
collaboration, not competition. Several NYCB dancers have recalled that seeing Russian ballet
classes emphasized the origins of their technique and culture; they saw in the classroom how
Balanchine’s style was an evolutionary branch of Russian classism and felt a personal connection
to the disciplinary structures of the Russian classroom that Balanchine and other Russian emigres
emulated in their training.247 In other words, Russia gave the American dancers a sense of history
and belonging in their artform not easily felt elsewhere, building their confidence as
professionals. Conversely, for Soviet dancers seeing Balanchine’s classes of heightened physical
extremes helped them reinterpret their repertoire. For example, Valery Panov, former Kirov
ballet star and Soviet dissenter, recalls that after the tour, “the New York style would come to my
mind every time I wanted to work out a choreographic pattern.”248 Subsequently, the ordeal led to
newfound discoveries about their dance practice on either side.
***
After months abroad, the troupe eventually returned in December of 1962, everyone
seemingly ecstatic to finally be out of the Soviet Union. For some, the trip’s ending meant finally
being able to reconnect with their families. At the airport, Allegra Kent finally reunited with her
young daughter, grateful that, as her husband put it, “she still knows who she is.”249 Others
thought only of catching up on sleep; others found themselves humbled and speechless at the
swarm of ballet fans awaiting them at the airport. However, there was little time for the dancers
to escape the pressures of performing. The company went straight to their preparations for the
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annual The Nutcracker performance season, and after a brief convalescence, Balanchine would
additionally choreograph two new works for the company’s next spring season.250
For the management of NYCB, the tour left them disillusioned with the USSR. Kirstein,
who still held on to socialist values, expressed a profound disappointment with the visit. He
insisted that the Russian people “don’t want to be liberated...they want to be left alone, to stew in
their own...national neurosis.”251 Furthermore, he wrote in a letter to one of his confidants about
the tour, “[w]e have not recovered yet and I don’t think Balanchine ever will; it corroborated his
worst fears and it shattered my greatest hopes.”252 The two men were both, though for very
different reasons, heartbroken.
Nevertheless, despite whatever personal disappointments they had about the visit, it
became clear that the trip benefited the company in the months following their return. In 1963
the Ford Foundation, one of the CIA's 'funding covers' for the psychological warfare mission,
gave the company a grant of $2,500,000, to be paid over ten years, and the School of American
Ballet $2,425,000 for an equal term, the largest sum ever dedicated to dance from a single
source.253 That year, the company also performed for President Kennedy's Second Anniversary
Inaugural Salute, which helped jumpstart a boom in its popularity. Presumably, with the help of
these grants and increased patronage from their connection to Kennedy, in 1966, NYCB
officially moved from the City Center Theater to the newer and larger New York State Theater,
where subscriptions to the theater significantly increased audience attendance. Thus, in the
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1960s, NYCB seemed to finally achieve the goals Kirstein had set for international renown and
support at home and became in the eyes of many the premier ballet company in the US and
perhaps the world.
Such sudden financial assistance and recognition by the federal government was
undoubtedly related to the State Department’s perceived success in NYCB’s Soviet Debut, for
the State Department found the tour to be a resounding success in the effort to beat the Soviets in
ballet in the Cultural Cold War. Indeed from the reporting they received on the ground in the
Soviet Union, NYCB’s appearance had sparked tangible changes in Soviet art, with Hans Tuch
noting in a memorandum “that the New York City Ballet deserves official recognition for its
contribution to the US objectives of the exchange program.”254 Meanwhile, in January of 1963,
attache Rocky Staples wrote that NYCB had started a transformation in the Soviet Union:
[A] tremendous struggle...began shortly after [NYCB’s] departure between the
party ideologues [sic], headed by K[hruschev] himself, and the creative
intelligentsia...There have been writers, painters, poets, and theater and film
people who have had the guts to stand up and say that art must have freedom to
experiment or it will die.255
To what extent Staples and Tuch’s assertions were accurate is unclear. Following the tour,
it certainly seems the Soviet government had some concern about the effect NYCB had on the
status of Soviet ballet. For instance, in 1963, the Ministry of Culture held the All-Union
Choreographic Conference to discuss the USSR’s possibility of falling behind the West in ballet.
Out of this conference came an increased dialogue between the Bolshoi, Kirov, and the Ministry
of Culture on ways to innovate the art form, furthering “the very practice of debate at the heart of

254

Quoted in Prevots, Dance for Export, 87.
Correspondence from Rocky Staples to Lincoln Kirstein, 12 January 1963, *MGZMD 97, Box. 11, Folder 177,
Lincoln Kirstein Papers, ca. 1914-1991, Jerome Robbins Dance Division, The New York Public Library for the
Performing Arts.
255

90

[Khruschev’s] thaw.”256 By recognizing Balanchine’s choreography as an extension of Russian
ballet traditions, artists gained leverage in the debate between dramballet and choreographic
symphonism, aiding in the renegotiation process between art and Soviet realism that ultimately
allowed for more flexibility in Soviet ballet choreography in the later Khrushchev years.
Nevertheless, these post NYCB intervention ballet experiments did not challenge the core
definition of Soviet ballet, a content-rich art that narrates ideologically appropriate stories in a
drama-rich style, in the radical way Rocky Staples suggested. Instead, following the Manege
Affair, there was “a series of meetings between the artistic intelligentsia and the Central
Committee Ideological Commission [that] reasserted party control over the arts along with the
central principles of Socialist Realism, partiinost’ and narodnost’.”257 Subsequently, ballet at the
end of Khrushchev’s power defined itself as a form that challenged the dramballet style and
pushed the limits of choreographic symphonism but still retained explicit representations of
Soviet values.
Thus while the State Department may not have accurately understood the Soviet response
to NYCB’s Soviet debut, it seemed for now that both sides benefited from the excursion.
Remarkably NYCB remained unscathed through the Cuban Missile Crisis, and though its
directors found the USSR disappointing for personal reasons in the year that followed, the
company saw an exponential increase in its popularity and financial aid. Conversely, for the State
Department, the most positive reviews of the company and choreographic trends following the
tour showed that NYCB had done its job to prove to the Soviets the quality of American ballet
and impress upon them the supposed superiority of democracy for artistic innovation.

256
257

Searcy, Ballet In The Cold War, 127.
Ezrahi, Swans of the Kremlin, 136.

91

Conclusion
Mission Success? American Ballet and Politics After 1962

1963, the year following NYCB’s Soviet debut, marked a critical turning point in the
relationship between dance and the federal government in the US. On October 23rd of that year,
President Kennedy addressed the graduating class of Amherst College with a speech now
understood as the epitome of his administration’s attitude toward the arts. He said:
If art is to nourish the roots of our culture, society must set the artist free to follow
his vision wherever it takes him. We must never forget that art is not a form of
propaganda; it is the truth…In free society art is not a weapon and it does not
belong to the spheres of polemic ideology…. [In] democratic society… the
highest duty of the writer, the composer, the artist is to remain true to himself…In
serving his vision of the truth, the artist best serves his nation… I look forward to
an America which will reward achievement in the arts as we reward achievement
in business or statecraft.258
These words were an extension of the Eisenhower Administration’s belief in the arts as a
tool to fight in the Cultural Cold War. Expanding on this belief, Kennedy here offered a vision of
America where the federal government supports art because it serves the nation not as just a form
of propaganda but as the very marker of American success against the Soviets. In the truest
sense, it is an argument built out of American exceptionalism made for the sentiment of the
Cultural Cold War, and it is in this that we see the logic behind the creation of one of the most
important acts of congress for the arts, the creation of the National Endowment for the Arts, or
NEA.259
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Indeed the thought of an endowment may have been in Kennedy’s mind as he gave this
speech. In May of 1963, August Heckscher, Kennedy’s special consultant on the arts, submitted
the “The Arts and National Government” report to congress. The report outlined an increased
demand for the arts by the American people and paid homage to Kennedy’s belief in art as the
utmost symbol of the free world. Its findings led to the establishment of the President’s Advisory
Council on the Arts, the direct predecessor of the current National Council on the Arts– the
current advisory board for the NEA.260 With the advisory council established, Kennedy’s time of
office became increasingly interested in arts and diplomacy until his assassination in November
of 1963.
The death of Kennedy only strengthened congress’ focus on the creation of the NEA,
signaling an opportunity for those like Senator Javits, who had long been proponents of funding
the arts. Subsequently, in January of 1965, both the house and the senate introduced bills calling
for a National Humanities Foundation.261 With both pieces of legislation gaining a significant
following, congress established the NEA later that year. Though the NEA began modestly, it
grew exponentially. Its budget increased tenfold from 1970 to 1975 from $8.3 million to $80
million and reached almost $149 million by 1979.262 American ballet companies benefited
significantly, with the NEA giving over $284 million in grants to dance companies from its
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inception through 2018.263 NYCB alone received over $2 million from the NEA during the
remainder of the Cold War.264
Nevertheless, as government intervention to support the arts increased in the years
following NCYB’s Soviet debut, the ballet exchange rapidly deteriorated. With Kennedy’s
efforts to consolidate the entire cultural diplomacy program and the growing frustrations between
the State Department and ANTA, it was decided in 1963 not to renew the contract between
ANTA and the State Department. 265 From that point on, the State Department directly handled
the entire process of organizing dance tours for export. After the ending of ANTA’s involvement
in cultural diplomacy, the ballet exchange became increasingly deformalized due to Sol Hurok’s
death in 1974, and the direct trade of Soviet companies for American ones became increasingly
sparse. Indeed, the last official Soviet-American ballet exchange occurred in 1972, two years
before the impresario’s death, with NYCB’s return to the Soviet Union, the tour that my father
participated in.266
Indeed my father’s trip to the Soviet Union in 1972 marked the beginning of the end for
American dance diplomacy in the Cold War. Though dance diplomacy continued until the end of
the Cold War, the use of ballet after 1972 became minimal. After the Soviet Union collapsed in
1991, the USIA became integrated into the State Department, and budgets were drastically cut as
part of a broader governmental restructuring act known as the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998. 267 Dance would not be sponsored again by the State Department until
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2003 when the Bush administration sent American dance choreographers to various Middle
Eastern countries to foster Westernized arts education. Though dance diplomacy has made a
return via American conflicts with the Middle East, these endeavors have been sparse and
according to Clare Croft, do not adequately meet the challenges of twenty-first century foreign
diplomacy by continuing the “war of ideas” model of diplomacy that underpinned the Cultural
Cold War.268
The collapse of dance diplomacy had a reverberating effect on American ballet. Thanks
to the federal investment in the arts in the 1960s, companies like NYCB finally found themselves
with a solid financial footing. This was perhaps the golden age of American ballet– a time when
companies like NYCB were recognized as some of the best in the world and had the financial
support to prove it, hiring more dancers, putting on more performances, and touring all over the
world. But when dance diplomacy disappeared from American politics, American ballet
companies struggled to maintain the size and level of performance it swelled to during the height
of the Cold War. In the case of NYCB, despite receiving many NEA grants and support from
groups like the Ford Foundation, the company today finds itself in a financial deficit.269
Moreover, with its original directors, George Balanchine and Lincoln Kirstein, now long gone
(Balanchine passed in 1983 and Kirstein in 1996), the Cold War-era audience aging, and a recent
series of scandals about sexual harassment and violence in the company, the future for NYCB
seems grim.270 Without a doubt, Kirstein would shudder at the company’s current state.
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Therefore it is hard to say if either side truly benefited from their exploitation of one
another. In this study, we saw that as propaganda and psychological warfare became central to
foreign policy in the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA and State Department used American
ballet to prove the country’s ability to cultivate high art and attempt to destabilize Soviet
ideology. Conversely, Lincoln Kirstein let these agencies use NYCB to increase the company’s
prestige abroad and secure the company financially. In this manner, both sides opted to send
NYCB to the Soviet Union in 1962 to benefit their respective agendas.
In the end, neither of these objectives were met. Though the State Department perceived
changes in choreographic trends and meetings between the Ministry of Culture and
choreographers as evidence that NYCB had greatly affected the Soviets, they misunderstood that
Soviet ballet was already in a transformative process by the time of Balanchine’s arrival and that
Balanchine’s choreography was implicitly tied to Russian ballet history. Meanwhile, though
NYCB thrived in the decade following its debut, its dependence on the Cold War has made it
difficult for the company to function on the same level since dance fell out of importance in
American diplomacy. Thus while ballet’s deep entanglement in Cold War diplomacy conflated its
importance and allowed the art form to prosper, ballet in America never gained the cultural status
of its Russian counterpart.
However, one would be wrong to believe that NCYB’s Soviet Debut had no long-term
benefits. Indeed the event led to an unintended consequence that remains to this day; the
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collaboration of American and Russian ballet companies. Balanchine’s reunion with his former
contemporaries at the Vaganova Academy sparked a newfound kinship between the groups. At
the company’s second appearance in 1972, the directors of the Bolshoi approached Balanchine
about setting some of his ballets on their dancers.271 Though this plan never came to fruition,
NYCB, the Bolshoi, and Kirov Ballets continued to communicate with one another. In 1988
principal dancers from the Bolshoi, Nina Ananiashvili and Andris Liepa, came to the US to
perform as guest artists with NYCB. For the first time in history, an American and Russian
company had exchanged dancers in collaboration with one another.272
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, this relationship only continued to grow.
On the Russian side, the Kirov and Bolshoi Ballets received the rights to perform many of
Balanchine’s works. In the case of the Kirov, Balanchine’s choreography today represents much
of their standard repertoire.273 Conversely, NYCB and other American ballet companies have
increasingly relied on Russian-based choreographers to create new pieces for their companies.
The most recent example of such a case is the success of dancer and choreographer Alexei
Ratmasky, who trained at the Bolshoi in the 1980s before turning to make ballets for both
Western and former Soviet ballet companies. He has created an extensive collection of works
specifically for NYCB, described by critics as the opening of new genres for ballet and the hope
for twenty-first century ballet after the death of George Balanchine in 1983.274 Though such
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cross-collaboration has recently come to a halt since Russia invaded Ukraine, there has yet to be
any evidence to suggest that the companies will not continue to share repertoire and
choreographers in the future.
Perhaps then, the lesson from the ballet exchange is that the performing arts are
invaluable in détente by encouraging collaboration. In the case of NYCB’s Soviet debut, we see
a moment in which, although the two nations were at extreme odds with one another, artists in
these two countries came together despite the hostility of the Cuban Missile crisis. Although
ballet cannot stop a war nor radically change a nation’s governmental ideology, NYCB’s Soviet
debut suggests that ballet can and should be used as a political weapon to foster communication
and collaboration between hostile nations.
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